THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST DURING BUSH’S ADMINISTRATION

The CASE OF IRAQ

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Dedication

To those close to my heart, every time you smile, you melt away my fears and fill my heart
With joy.

To those who battle life each day and feel they are growing weak and losing the battles,
you might be losing few battles but you are winning the war.

To the younglings who are pressured to think they are growing too old to fulfill their
dreams, you can do it, dreams know no age.

To whoever taught me a word, a skill, or an attitude, without all of you I would not be the
person I am today (thank you).

To those who held my hand when I was down and supported me when my feet were
bruised, I shall support you and be there for you for the rest of my life.
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Abstract

Democracy export and promotion have always been part US foreign policy, as ideals and values of freedom and human rights have always been ingrained within the American society. After World War II, the USA helped to develop and to support different political systems all around the world in its role as the sole super power willing to spread democracy. The United States supported even autocratic governments as a means to promote stability and protect its interests. After the 9/11 attacks, however, the USA shifted its support for autocracies in the Middle East in favor of advancing democracy through any means necessary to protect its interests. This Memoire will focus on the motivations and history of US democracy promotion around the world after the Second World War and after the 9/11 and how successful and real those efforts were. As the Middle East has been a central focus of the US foreign policy; the memoire will take Iraq as a case study.
Résumé

La démocratie et la promotion des exportations a toujours fait partie de la politique étrangère des États-Unis, comme des idéaux et des valeurs de la liberté et des droits de l'homme ont toujours été ancrés dans la société américaine. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les USA ont contribué à développer et à soutenir des systèmes politiques différents dans le monde entier pour son rôle en tant qu'unique superpuissance prêt à répandre la démocratie. Les États-Unis ont appuyé les gouvernements autocratiques même comme un moyen de promouvoir la stabilité et protéger ses intérêts. Après les attaques du 11 septembre cependant, les USA s'appuyer pour les autocraties au Moyen-Orient en faveur de l'avancement de la démocratie par tous les moyens nécessaires pour protéger ses intérêts. Ce mémoire se concentre sur les motivations et l'histoire d'entre nous à la promotion de la démocratie dans le monde après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et après le 11 septembre et le succès réel et ces efforts ont été. Comme le Moyen-Orient a été un point central de la politique étrangère des États-Unis ; la mémoire prend l'Iraq comme étude de cas.
تعزيز وتصدير الديمقراطية كانت دائماً جزءًا من السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية، ومثلها من القيم والحرية وحقوق الإنسان التي هي جزء من المجتمع الأمريكي. بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية، دعمت الولايات المتحدة وصفتها قوة عظمى انتشار الديمقراطية في مختلف الأنظمة السياسية في العالم. كما أن الولايات المتحدة دعمت الأنظمة القمعية من أجل الاستقرار، وكذلك من أجل مصالحها. بعد هجمات الحادي عشر من سبتمبر حولت الولايات المتحدة دعمها للأنظمة الشمولية في الشرق الأوسط من أجل دعم الديمقراطية وكذلك للحفاظ على مصالحها. هذه المذكرة تركز على دوافع الولايات المتحدة لتعزيز الديمقراطية في جميع أنحاء العالم عقب الحرب العالمية الثانية عقب هجمات الحادي عشر من سبتمبر ومدى نجاح تلك الجهود الحقيقية، بما أن جهود السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية مركزة على الشرق الأوسط وكذلك أخذ العراق كحالة خاصة.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CPA: Coalition Provision Authority
IGC: Iraqi Governing Council
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NED: National Endowment for Democracy
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations
NIE: National Intelligence Estimate
NSDD: National Security Decision Directive
NSS: National Security Strategy
OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
ORHA: Office of Reconstruction and Human Aid
PNAC: The Project for the New American Century.
RRMT: Rapid Reaction Media Team
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
WMDs: Weapons of Mass Destruction
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General introduction

Since the US assumed and acknowledged its role as a superpower, it has not shied from pronouncing the centrality of the Middle East as a national interest priority. Not that long time ago in 1944 President Franklin Roosevelt described this region as of vital interest ‘to the US. He stressed the maintenance of peace ‘in the Middle East as central to US and international concerns. Several decades later, and with the demise of the British Empire, and later Britain’s withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in the late 60s, the US adopted the role of the new security guarantor in the Middle East. The US objective was primarily achieved indirect intervention in the Middle East; through the US military evolvement. From its initiation as a superpower status, the US has taken its policing role seriously. It has insisted that peace be preserved, however, only on its own terms.

Throughout the Cold War, the US maintained its existence at the controls of the Middle East attempting to throw out the Soviet Union, influence or impact over this strategically valuable place. The US was largely successful in denying the Soviet Union a foothold. The security of Israel and access of world oil markets were also secured during this period. At the height of the Cold War the US strategy was restricted simply to managing regional actors and drive them away from the Soviet influence. To this end, the US policy became focused to maintaining friendly relations with willing regional actors on the one hand, and on the other to discouraging regional enemy from engaging in relations with the Soviet Union. Throughout these events. Iraq, which is the focus of this Memoire, engaged in an unpredictable relationship with the United States, depending on the nature of government in Baghdad and the distinctive geopolitical context, Iraq, like other regional countries in Middle East was a victim of superpowers conflict. The US continued this policy after the end of the
Cold War, attempting to prevent the emergence of regional hegemony through the pursuit of strategies of containment and confrontation with potential competitors to US hegemony in the Middle East region.

This study takes 1979 as the starting point. This year is greatly significant as it is the same year Saddam Hussein gained ultimate power as the president of Iraq, ironically the beginning of the US lean towards Iraq. The Carter administration’s desire for revived relations with Iraq was only further strengthened with the Reagan administration’s engagement with Saddam’s regime. This was also a policy pursued by the George H. W. Bush administration, only to be revised after Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. The Clinton administration which applied a policy of ‘dual containment’ against both Iraq and Iran.

Bush presidency provided an excellent platform from which to assess continuity and change in US Iraq policy which is the central premise of this Memoire. The attacks on 9/11, perpetrated during the early months of the George W. Bush administration, provided a major and significant baseline from which this study attempts to test US policy towards Iraq. George W. Bush’s administration was extremely significant as his two terms in office were undeniably rich in major events. Some of these events were external, outside his control, while many were within his control and a direct result of his proactive foreign policy.

As a beginning, this dissertation aims to answer some important questions: What is bush II democracy stands for? Why did president saddam have to be removed by U.S. forces without international consensus? How will the U.S. administration proceed with its plan (democratization process) in Middle East? To What Extent is Post 9/11 U.S. Foreign Policy a Continuation of Previously Established ‘New Imperialist’ Ambition?
This study will demonstrate the existence of imperialist ambitions “democratization”, on behalf of the U.S., from the period between 9/11 until 2009, which will also serve to explain the country’s post 9/11 foreign policy development. By displaying the existence of this imperialist trajectory, this study will provide a necessary exploration into the development of U.S. foreign policy and will reveal the extent to which the imperialist aspects of post 9/11 echo previously established imperialist ambitions. The reasoning behind the decision to engage in a war with Iraq is a contentious issue. With the initial security threats of Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction being discredited and the questionable extent to which humanitarian motivations were deployed. This study will have an important place in helping understand the reasons behind the apparent post 9/11 imperialist foreign policy.

There is debate around the US foreign policies towards the Middle East as well as the rest of the world, and therefore this question will be tackled first. Chomsky in his book *Hegemony or Survival? America’s Quest for Global Dominance* in which published in 2004 points out that the current Bush planners, although at the extreme end of the traditional US policy spectrum, do share their programs and doctrines with previous US governments as well as earlier aspirants for global power. However, unlike previously “the stakes are much higher today. The choice between hegemony and survival has rarely, if ever, been so starkly posed” Chomsky, N. (2004)

This paper was conducted using a methodology that is both descriptive and analytical. A set of articles, books, and reviews were all analyzed to give a clear description of the topic in hand. The analytical part was done mostly while reading the sources in order to really grasp the meaning or interpretation of the writers and figure out which opinions and arguments that
would serve the research. After that, and especially at the beginning of the work, the
descriptive methodology takes place in order to give a clear image or information about the
topic so that the reader would have an overall idea about the discussed topic. As for the in
text-citations as well as the works cited, the Modern Language Association style (MLA)
seventh edition has been followed.

This work is divided in two chapters. The first chapter is much more informative since
it deals mostly with general backgrounds of the American foreign policy toward Middle East
in particular during Reagan, bush, and Clinton administrations. This relation between USA
and Middle East reach its peak during George Herbert Walker Bush in 1991 when USA made
a coalition against Iraq. The second chapter however, I took Iraq as a key study in this study I
try to investigate the controversy surrounding the case of 2003 war on Iraq, which is embodied in
the plural reasons for the war, also the result of this invasion on whole region.
Chapter one

Background of U.S. – Middle East Interaction

Introduction

If we look at US policies in the Middle East and the Islamic world in the period from 2002 to mid-2013, we notice a cycle from complete involvement to far reaching disengagement. We can pinpoint some specific and distinct strategies of power projection, under Bush first based on internationalist foreign policies. The cycle of political transition that started with the Iraq and Afghan wars in 2001/03 moved towards and the Arab Spring, and then from 2008 under Obama, started to move in opposite direction, towards ever greater aloofness. In this chapter, can discuss a historical overview about Middle East and how both civil and political society function in practice in the region. In particular the research investigates how the US approached its new Foreign policy of democracy promotion in the Middle East and how the Middle East-US relation has been changed after 9/11. the main purpose of United States in Middle East is to control the oil supply through using new political method which called the democracy promotion, but the most important question here did the US succeeded to imposing this new method?

I. Historical Background of the Middle East

a) Civil society in theory and its practice in the Middle East:

In present day civil society is one of the modern concepts besides the concept of democracy, human rights, rule of law, justice, the free market and citizenship that are constantly discussed. Since the 9/11 attacks and the beginning of the US democracy promotion
the strengthening of civil society has become an essential elements for the democratic transition in the Middle East in particular and the rest of Islamic world.

The concept of civil society can be defined as, the area or zone of voluntary bond life beyond family and groups affiliations which is created by groups of people constituting the public sphere but are completely deferent from the sphere of states. This cooperation life can consist of self-organizing groups, movements or individuals such as women’s groups, neighborhood associations, non-profit organizations, intellectual organizations, religious and clan organizations. As American author Amy Hawthorne said: “These different kinds of groups, movements, organizations etc seek to establish associations, solidarities and articulate values which can be linked together by their common interests” (11).

The main point with creating civil societies in a community is to limit the intervention of the state in the public area. To completely acquire democracy a dialog must exist in order to have a mutual understanding of politics in the public spheres, not just accepting all decisions by the government. Government policy and social activities may be changed by civil society movements because they represent the interests of its citizens. Further, it is argued that:“ civil societies can create a form of balance to state power due to the public sphere of citizen activity which functions beyond the direct control of the government”(ibid 5).

The development of the civil society throughout history in the Arab world has been divided into four elements. Civil society in the first phase before the European power domination consisted of community-based self-help groups, religious and educational institutions i.e. traditional community. During the European colonialism the second phase began which referred to the emergence of independent civil activity groups such as trade
unions, cultural groupings, intellectual and Islamist organizations across the region like a brotherhood in Egypt in 1923. These modern forms of associative life have been often politically active and were of importance in supporting the citizen right during nationalist struggles. The third phase started when the Arab countries got independent. During this phase civil society organizations were either repressed or turned into state-dominated institutions by the new regimes because they believed that independent associative life might threaten national. In the 1980s the fourth phase began. This phase saw a liberalization of the civil society process. The spread of Islamist movements contributed to make a kind of balance in civil society, international influences, Arab government's implementation of limited economic and political liberalization in order to stay in power whereas the fact that they allowed new non-governmental organization (NGOs) to form are some factors that have contributed to this phase (Amy 6).

Today, in the Middle East the civil society consists of five sectors. In most of the Arab nations the first sector comprises of Islamic civil society which consists many groups, associations and movements. These Islamic organizations provide social services such as education, employment assistance, medical care as well as religious instruction and guidance. This sector is the most active and widespread form of civil society in the Arabs middle east where the different movements have diverse forms and political orientations (Sean 22).

Non-governmental service organizations (NGOs) are included in the second sector of Arab civil society. Arab countries have realized the role associational life play in society developments while being worried about the support radical Islamic movements are gaining thus encouraging NGOs as an alternative source. The third sector consists of professional
organizations such as professional association (doctors, lawyers, engineers etc), labor unions and chambers of commerce. These associations and unions are among the largest civil societies in several Arab countries with a history of involvement in nationalist political campaigns and their main task is to deliver social and economic services to their members. Associations whose main goal is to raise solidarity and companionship, and provide services among groups of friends, relatives, colleagues and relatives compounds the fourth sector. Mutual aid societies that for example helps migrants of Egypt's urban areas who immigrates from certain villages, societies of artists, writers and youth organizations make up this sector (ibid 06).

The last sector of civil society in the Arab world consists of prodemocracy affiliations. This sector is the newest and less experienced one where the expansion has been developed by political reforms and hopes of western democracy. According to many democracy promoters it is believed that associations in this sector make up the "Arab civil society" but the groups are smaller both in number and membership than the movements in the other four sectors (Sean 28).

Condoleezza Rice, the US former Secretary of State, expressed that even though changes in terms of universal suffrage such as educations for girls and women and more influential parliaments are slow, the US have taken appropriate measures to promote civil society in the Middle East. The effort to raise civil society by the US has been done through issuing programs promoting civil society movements such as the “Forum for the Future” and the “Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)” (Rice 16). And by pushing non-democratic regimes in the AME through public and private diplomacy to transform their regimes.
b) Political Society in Theory and Practice in the Middle East:

One of the most essential elements to a state of being a democracy is to have an effective political society. If the state does not have an equal functioning political society toward its citizen, it is for sure to call it a democratic state since the citizens human and civil rights cannot be fully ensured. Human and civil rights are necessary to those citizens living in democratic states. All people should have equal rights and living standards regardless of race, religion, age, sexual orientation, gender or political affiliation. Political society which is one of the most important parts for a democratic transition refers to free electoral competition where the legitimate tasks of a political society is to create intermediation compromises between civil society and the state (Linz and Stephen 4).

The Middle East is a region that has some of the most aggressive and enduring authoritarian regimes in the world. The political society or process within these countries differs significantly from those countries with a democratic regime. In the Arab Middle East the constitutions are issued by the elites rather than being issued from the people and therefore the authoritarian regimes influences the different electoral laws that emerge” (Laleh 18). Basically the politicians in power in the region have been in power for many years. for instance King Fahd, Egypt’s president Mubarak and Gaddafi have been in power between 23-35 years while in Syria, Morocco and Jordan the leaders were replaced by their sons when they died after respectively 31, 40 and 47 years in Algeria, Tunisia.

It is argued that in to single-party regimes the elite prefer electoral laws that concentrate on the legislative power in the hands of a dominant party while monarchs prefers system where representation to a wide range of parties is allowed. This means that establishment of electoral
system in single-party regimes and monarchs should be different but in the Middle East this does not occur due to authoritarian regimes. It is argued that these regimes possess four characteristics: “One, they cannot tolerate organized groups within their own structure. Two, they tend to deal with the people not as individuals but as members of some larger regional. Three, they systematically stopped the development of an active class consciousness” (Roger 35). Thus, they want to have total control of organized groups such as civil society movements, decisions affecting all individuals are made behind closed doors and divisions in regimes are hidden in the interest of presenting a united front.

US Former secretary of state argued that the problems arising in the middle east is not that people resist the basics of democracy (right to choose those who will govern them and other basic freedoms) but that when these people have freely elected democratic leaders through political activity. Laleh Khalil argues that: “the creation of new electoral institutions is dependent on the power and performance of the involved player thus the more powerful these players are the better chance they have in forcing the creation of institutions which fits their preferences best” (271). Basically this is occurring in the Arab Middle East where stronger elites negotiate new rules with weaker opponents in limited political conventions.

It was believed that by incorporating human rights and promoting democratic development it would entail stability in the Arab Middle East where a rising middle class will contribute to the creation of centers of social power for political parties and movements. Condoleezza Rice stated that: “providing foreign aid, assistance and security cooperation the US could obtain its foreign policy goals and help countries develop self-sufficiency” (22). After 9/11 the United States approach regarding its promotion of political society has been very clear. The forward
strategy of freedom has suggested that America’s predilection of promoting political and economic freedoms has been reflected through its new policy (23).

II. United States and the Middle East: Historical Overview

The Middle East region’s is a very importance area in the world, as Wallace argues: “make[s] it not only a vital U.S. interest but also an increasingly global one” (3) and he rightly points that “Over the past half century, the Persian Gulf region has become an increasingly important but problematic area of interest for U.S. foreign policy” (1). This has been asserted further by Hunter, who rightly indicates that the US’s continuous involvement in the middle east region has been determined by a constant strategy to preserve the US’s political and economic interests since the Truman Doctrine in the 1940s and this led to invade IRAQ in 2003.

Historically, the Soviet’s threat to the Middle East security during the Cold War has been perceived as the major challenge facing US interests in the region from the 1950s to the 1980s. The Soviet goal translated into policy when the United States declared the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, in which it vowed to support any state in the Middle East that was threatened by international communism. This declaration was instantly welcomed at that time by King Saud of Saudi Arabia as he agreed to renew the American access to the Dhahran in Saudi Arabia airfield for five years and the US, in turn, pledged to develop the Saudi navy and provide Saudi Arabia with military assistance (Gause 13). The US kept up military and political relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia as friendly States to preserve Gulf regional security, with the US offering to protect the two states from any internal or external threats in order to keep the region stable and US interest's prominent. The US's close ties with both
Saudi Arabia and Iran stemmed from the US's concerns about increased Soviet power and as a result the US became increasingly involved in the Gulf's defense affairs (Kemp and Saunders 2).

In 1979, President Carter explicitly expressed that Soviet challenge and described the consequences of the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan as ‘the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War’. He considered the ‘increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders’ as one of the primary US security challenges (Carter 33). President Reagan walk on the same path of Carter Doctrine, in which he acted to provide Gulf defense and reinforced this policy through supporting Afghan resistance (El-moudjahedine) against Soviet invasion with deferent military equipment. Eventually, because of the US and Saudi Arabian support. The Afghan resistance succeeded in their war against the Soviet Union and this led to complete Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Noticeably, it was obvious that without Saudi Arabian and US assistance, the Soviet army would have defeated the resistance and built up military bases that could have created real threats to the Middle East. Michael Hudson stated that the Soviet expansion in the oil-rich Gulf region could have affected the world economies and would critically upset the world balance and therefore the US's goals were embodied in preventing the Soviet Union from dominating the region, limiting oil production, and raising prices (22).

It can be noticed from a historical standpoint that during the Cold War era, the US focused on three objectives in middle east: to contain Soviet expansion; maintain oil flow at stable prices, and protect the security of the states that have good relations with the US. the American economic, political and strategic goals have rendered the Gulf region paramount in American foreign policy during and after the Cold War era (Gause 3). and this has coincided
with a US vision that defending the Arabs region is an essential part of the US defense strategy in the post-Cold War era.

The US was successful in its policy of containment, although the distraction of the Soviet military capability, political and ideological challenge created new space for the United States to create new security policy in the Middle East region. However, the policy, on examination, was not totally new. In the post-Cold War period US objectives in the middle east were still focused on Gulf oil resources at reasonable prices and protecting the Gulf's regional security and stability against any (non-USA) hegemony. This was evident in the 1998 National Security Strategy which states that:

Where the U.S. has clear, vital interests, the American military helps assure the security of our allies and friends. The reinforcement of U.S. forces in the Gulf from Fall 1997 to Spring 1998 clearly illustrates the importance of military power in achieving U.S. national security objectives and stabilizing a potentially volatile situation. (The White House 12)

Historically, US interests have been explicitly revealed in the United States Security Strategy that was issued during President Reagan’s administration, which mentions that the US's main interests in the Middle East are embodied in: ‘maintaining regional stability, containing and reducing Soviet influence, preserving the security of Israel and our other friends in the area, retaining access to oil on reasonable terms for ourselves and our allies, and curbing state-sponsored terrorism.’. Likewise, the National Security report submitted by the Bush administration in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 had emphasized the above traditional declared goals and added new strategic objectives which materialized in ‘curbing
the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles and countering terrorism’ (The White House 10).

III. United States and Democratic Promotion in the Middle East

Obviously, the strategy of democracy promotion could be understood through put it within the broader context of the stop US attempts to influence the Middle East politics and preserve its enduring vital interests. As Tamara Wittes observes: “Ongoing American involvement in the region is a foregone conclusion therefore, the question is not whether U.S. actions ought to impact Arab political development, but in what way” (Watts 23).

Significantly, the Gulf’s regional security and stability continues to be most important to US-Arabs relations and therefore G. W. Bush's appeals for democracy were unsure, since any policy of democratization is caught between the US's long-standing relations with the Arab regimes, which contributed remarkably to maintaining the American political and economic interests in the region, and the proclaimed project of promoting liberal and democratic values that could, from a US standpoint, reinforce the Gulf's long-term regional stability. In effect, this understanding will allow examination of the US's promotion of democracy in the Gulf region and illustrate how, in practice, they have been characterized by pragmatism (Wittes23).

Therefore, contrary to some prevailing arguments, this part argues that the G. W. Bush administration's policy of promoting democracy in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf region in particular should be seen as a broadly traditional pursuit consistent with the predecessor administrations, and therefore his policy did not depart from US traditional policy. Remarkably, successive administrations since President Reagan in the 1980s had perceived the
spreading of American liberal and democratic values in the Middle East as one of the mechanisms that could maintain ongoing stability, bring prosperity and serve US long-standing interests in the Middle East. However, the strategy has become a paramount exigency in G. W. Bush's foreign policy, although it balances between a US idealistic liberalism ideology and US economic and security realism in dealings with the Gulf oil monarchies.

a) Promoting Democracy Prior to 9/11

The American administrations had consistently asserted the validity of the expansion of democracy worldwide in the 1980s and in the post-cold war era. So, democracy promotion started with President Ronald Regan (1981-1989); it continued its development under George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) and under the Clinton administration (1993-2001).

Ronald Reagan Although the promotion of democracy is long rooted in US political and liberal culture, it did not take shape in US foreign policy in an organized manner until the Ronald Reagan administration in the 1980s. The Reagan administration practiced innovative efforts to make democracy a central belief of US policy and most subsequent administrations have continued to support its expansion abroad. This policy was advanced further under the Clinton administration and reached its high level in US foreign policy under the G. W. Bush administration (Markakis 76-78).

President Reagan (1981-1989) had institutionalized the democratization process through the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in order to assist and support democracy promotion worldwide. Simultaneously, the Reagan administration matched democracy promotion with the preservation of US interests through maintaining the US’s: “long-standing Cold War friendships with autocratic governments” (Carothers 16). US relations with Saudi Arabia and the other smaller Arab Gulf States were consolidated to keep
the region out of reach of communism and to enhance mutual economic cooperation. Interestingly, G. W. Bush's democracy policy represents a continuation of that same policy.

G.H.W. Bush  Under the *George Herbert Walker Bush* administration, promotion of democracy slow up behind as the administration’s attitudes were substantially realist and sought to keep relations with undemocratic regimes in the Gulf region, as a priority over democracy promotion. But after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, democracy promotion emerged as one of the administration concerns and this was evident in his speech when he states that: “in a world where we are the only remaining superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its moral and material resources to promote a democratic peace” (Bush 93).

**Bill Clinton:** The Clinton administration placed democracy among its prominent priorities in US foreign policy as he stated:

> Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other. They make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy.

(Clinton 22)

However, Clinton practically pursued a ‘semi-realist’ approach and this was evident through his integration of the ‘U.S. ideals and interests’ with democratization. Hence, he viewed promoting democracy as a suitable tool to maintain peace and also Preserve US core economic and security interests such as access to oil, trade, and cooperation with the peace process in the Middle East. For sure, maintaining such interests in the Gulf region necessitated maintaining good relations with nondemocratic regimes and even the reinforcement of these relations. Hence, the Clinton administration “has preserved close U.S. ties with autocratic
regimes that serve U.S. interests on oil, the Arab–Israeli peace process, and resistance to Islamic fundamentalist groups” (Carothers 3).

Generally speaking, democracy promotion under both Reagan and Clinton was an important element in US foreign policy, though it consisted of two components; -U.S. ideals and interests- and this has been emphasized by Thomas Carothers as he rightly states that: “U.S. policy during both [Reagan and Clinton] was an amalgam of heady pro-democracy rhetoric and mixed pro-democratic and traditional realist policies” (Carother 17). Indeed, the realist attitudes dominated in US foreign policy, even in the zone of democracy, and this has been further asserted by Thomas Carothers as he argues that: ‘Where democracy appears to fit in well with U.S. security and economic interests, the United States promotes democracy. Where democracy clashes with other significant interests, it is downplayed or even ignored’ (Carothers 3).

In summary, prior to September 11, 2001 there was a lack of interest in promoting democracy in the middle east region and this has been evident through the weak relations that the US maintained with Arab Gulf regimes to protect its economic and security interests. Hence, the administrations of George H. W. Bush, Clinton and the first few months, before the 9/11 attacks, of G. W. Bush had maintained relations with the Gulf allies as an acceptable alternative to the Islamic groups.

b) United States and Democracy promotion in Middle East in post 9/11th:

i) The September 11th Attack and its Consequences:

On a clear autumn morning of an ordinary day in New York, a big terror struck from the sky. This terror was from an American Airlines flight number 11 which had left Boston a few minutes earlier which was potentially taken over by the Islamic hijackers. This hijacking
attack flew in the World Trade Center northern tower. After 15 minutes, another United Airlines flight number 15 from Boston followed the same disastrous way stroking the Southern tower (Pauwels 200).

Consequently, there were many New Yorkers fled to Manhattan, while some others were trapped inside the two buildings which scrambled down the stairways to safety only those who were lucky to reach the bottom. Unexpectedly, an unimaginable event happened which was the collapse of the Twin Towers burying several thousand innocent victims under the fragments. One hour later precisely at 9:43 am, an American Airlines flight number 77 hijacked the Pentagon in Washington DC killing some 200 people. Another United Airlines flight number 93 targeted the White House, but it was miraculously taken over by heroic passengers to a forest in Pennsylvania southeast of Pittsburgh (200).

Additionally, weeks later after the attacks, “mysterious envelopes” containing “anthrax powder” were posted around the country. These envelopes which contained a powerful and lethal germ were sent both to famous personalities in the political and information spheres and to anonymous individuals. So, the Senate was closed for weeks because of “decontamination” and also because of a general wave of terror following these chemical attacks swept across the country. But unlike the previous terrorist attacks, this time it was feared the menacing chemical threat of bio-terrorism (200).

Therefore, this was not the first time that America was attacked on its soil, because in 1993, the very same World Trade Center had been already bombed. Yet, most of Americans still believed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was their most dangerous enemy. Since the invasion of Kuwait more than a decade before and the Gulf War that followed, Iraqi’s President had indeed been topping America’s most wanted list. All across the terms of the
three Presidents: George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, the U.S. attempts were unsuccessful at catching the dictator whose total unwillingness to comply with the UN disarmament policies. This led to bringing the USA several times to the brink of war (202). So, after the decline of the conflict of the Cold War between the United States and the USSR, the 9/11 attacks opened the door to a new war with the terrorists of Al-Qaeda. This new war against new enemy is called the “Global War on Terror”.

ii) The American “Global War on Terror”:

According to McKeever and Davies, the three presidents which are always considered as the greatest in American History were war time leaders: George Washington won the War of Independence; Abraham Lincoln won the Civil War; and Franklin D. Roosevelt won the Second World War. So, President George W. Bush, who came into office with the weakest of popular mandates, is required to mobilize the people and the government and to achieve victory in the war on terror (04).

In the weeks that followed the September 11 attacks, the United States vowed to punish the criminals who had brought destruction to American territory and developed a comprehensive plan to dismantle terrorist networks at home and abroad. To justify the immediate measures that were taken to fight terrorism, President George W. Bush said: “We’re a nation at war”. Five years later, on the anniversary of the attacks, he repeated: “We’re engaged in a global war against an enemy that threatens all civilized nations. And today the civilized world stands together to defend our freedom; we stand together to defeat the terrorists; and we are working to secure the peace for generations to come”. Consequently, in this global war on terrorism, America stands again as a beacon for fundamental human values and as a for tress of freedom (214-220).
Internally, institutional answers to the attacks came quickly, because Congress passed a joint resolution (107-40) to authorize the President to use all means, including military, to fight terrorism. On the executive side, in order to ensure domestic safety, George W. Bush established an Office of homeland security at the White House early October 2001, led by former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge. The agenda was to develop a new comprehensive strategy to strengthen protection against terroristic threats or attacks in the United States. The Office made recommendations and measures in order to increase the safety of the American citizens (214-220).

In July 2002, the President proposed a National Strategy for Homeland Security and asked Congress to establish a new and single Department of Homeland Security, which its primary objectives were to prevent new terrorist attacks on the American soil and to reduce the vulnerability of the nation to terrorism. This department was later created by a congressional act in November, 25 2002 with an initial budget of $20 billion. The Department worked to find proper tactics for “detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist threats or attacks within the United States”, as its mission statement indicated (214-220).

On Capitol Hill Congressmen were also active. On October 26, 2001, the President signed a bill that had gone through both assemblies at full speed, which became the USA Patriot Act. Fighting terrorism domestically required expanded powers on the part of law enforcement agencies. As a consequence, stricter security standards were imposed on airlines and at borders. Immigrants, suspected of terrorism, could be detained and even deported. Monitoring of financial transactions and communications, even private ones, was increased at the expense of civil liberties. Among the potential tactics used by the terrorists
were biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, more generally identified as “weapons of mass destruction” (214-220).

A week after 9/11, President George W. Bush had warned that there would be “a campaign against terrorist activity, a worldwide campaign” and singled out the governments which supported or sheltered terrorist groups. Operations Enduring Freedom, which began on October 7, 2001, was part of this global response, spearheaded by the United States, with the United Nations’ blessing. First, Afghanistan, with its fundamentalist Taliban regime, was targeted as a shelter for terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. Heavy bombardments sought to destroy training camps and help capture Al-Qaeda leaders. The operation also involved American troops in the Philippines, to fight against the Islamist separatist group led by Abu Sayyaf, who were suspected of organizing the Bali car bombing of October 12, 2002, and in the Horn of Africa to conduct counterterrorist controls. By the end of 2001, the Talibans had been ousted from power in Kabul, but Osama Bin Laden has assumed hideout could not be located. Three years later, on October 9, 2004, Afghans elected their first post-Taliban president Hamid Karzai (214).

Once the Afghanistan campaign had seemingly succeeded, the Bush Administration now turned to another nation notoriously supported or sheltered terrorists, which is Iraq. President Bush, in his State of the Union address of January 2003, designated Saddam Hussein as a dangerous dictator who eventually needs to be removed. Arguments ranged from the Iraqi regime’s ties with terrorist networks to its assumed possession of “weapons of mass destruction”, chemical, biological, and nuclear. International suspicions were fueled by Saddam Hussein’s reluctant compliance with the United Nations’ resolution 687 of April 3, 1991 that mandated all of Iraq’s weapons to be destroyed. So, President George W. Bush
warned the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in his January 2003 address by telling him: “If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm… For the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him”. The beginning of the disarmament of Saddam Hussein was on March 20, 2003 with the help of a scanty coalition of military allies (215).

The war in Iraq, which was originally labeled “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, sought officially to remove Saddam Hussein and preventively destroy all of Iraq’s deadly arsenal. On May 1, 2003, On board USS Abraham Lincoln in the Gulf, President Bush announced the end of major combat in Iraq and optimistically declared that, in the battle of Iraq, the United States and its allies had prevailed. Finally, Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13, 2003 and after a long hectic trial was found guilty of crimes against humanity and hanged December 30, 2006. Meanwhile, keeping civil peace in Iraq proved a formidable challenge for America and its allies (215).

IV. Democracy Policy and the Role of Neoconservatives

The 9/11 terrorist attacks played an influential role in forming and implementing the democratization strategy. Significantly, the election of G. W. Bush in 2001, along with the ascendance of some neoconservative individuals to the defense department has redirected US foreign policy during the first term of the Bush administration. As such, this group of neoconservatives had exploited the September 11th tragedy to formulate the President’s inclinations toward the Middle East region. As a result of the policy reorientation, ‘several neoconservative predispositions and agendas assumed relevance.’ (Lynch 137; Russell 107). Indeed, the effect of that group of personages has been evidenced through an intensified American world view by which G. W. Bush stated it is the US's duty and mission
to ‘liberalize’ the world. This vision was evident in his statement before the National Endowment for Democracy in November 6, 2003, in which he outlined a broadened worldview through ‘a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East’ (Bush 22).

Interestingly, the Iraq invasion demonstrated the influential effect of the neoconservatives inside the presidency establishment during its first term in office. This faction set their vision based on a ‘domino theory’ premise by which the neoconservatives thought that toppling the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq would intimidate other authoritarian regimes in the region and that this would lead eventually to strengthening the pro-democratic movements and reinforcing their demands for political change. Notably, this assumption has become a central justification for the Iraq war among the neoconservative foreign policy intellectuals (Brownstein 2002). and therefore Daniel Brumberg claimed that Bush's statements clearly showed that the President has fully embraced the neo-conservatives’ calls to extend the global democratic revolution to the Middle East(Blumberg 1). Conversely, others argue that G. W. Bush's response to September 11 was "shaped by forces more enduring than those of neoconservative intellectuals.' (Lynch 139).

V. Evaluating the W. Bush Administration’s Middle East Policy

U.S. foreign policy tends to be a product of a multitude of several interrelated dynamics. These dynamics contribute, to varying degrees, to the making of the ultimate geostrategic preferences. The geopolitical discourse in terms of which ‘self-image’ and the ‘other’ are defined, appears to be the key force that guides the official thinking. Conceptually, the notion of ‘American exceptionalism’ has captured the worldviews of Democratic and Republican administrations alike. President George W. Bush asserted “our nation is chosen by God and commissioned by history to be a model to the world”(55). Hence, exceptionalism and its
consequent feeling of cultural superiority have shaped America’s geopolitical perception of
the world and its role atop it. Thus, Islamism was conceptualized within this context of self-
assigned mission of democracy promotion, and human rights protection, undermining the
forces of darkness (Charles 3).

Diverse U.S. tactical approaches to the Middle East were, to certain extent, influenced
by the given administration’s conceptual reference and geopolitical worldview. For instance,
George W. Bush’s coercive diplomacy (freedom agenda) and militarized policy (Global War
on Terror) were rooted in a synthesis of various foreign policy trends, including conservative
nationalism, neo-conservatism, and defensive realism. Whereas, Barack Obama’s
reconciliatory posture towards the Muslim world, as reflected in his speeches in Ankara, April
2009, and Cairo, June 2009, revealed the liberal internationalist orientation of his
administration, where peaceful engagement and multilateralism constitute the core pillars of
Obama’s foreign policy, as delineated in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2010.56
Finally, U.S. geostrategic behavior in certain circumstances tends to be influenced by the
prevailing global and regional balance of power. The demise of the U.S.-backed autocratic
power structures, as a result of the Arab revolt, altered the regional balance of power, where
U.S. capability to impede Islamists’ ascendance to power seems to have been constrained
immeasurably. The post-Arab spring geopolitical landscape further empowered the grassroots
moderate Islamic movements, whose domination of the political scene is highly likely (Charles
5).

In short, the post-Cold War U.S. Middle East policy was not only dysfunctional, but
also counterproductive, both reinforcing the autocratic status quo, and widening the anti-
American sentiment. This policy failure can largely be attributed to; the misreading of the role
of Islam as the primary source of ideological, and political inspiration; geostrategic miscalculation of the growing socio-political significance of Islamism as the leading catalyst of change; and mismanagement of the region’s geopolitical landscape, where the U.S. invariably aligned itself with tyrannical regimes, unconditionally supported Israel, and failed to hold a sustainable strategic dialogue with moderate Islamists. These accumulations, along with other reasons, ultimately led to the eruption of the Arab spring at the outset of 2011.

**Conclusion**

As a conclusion, after our focus on the main American foreign plans and strategies in the aftermath of the 9/11, we say that the American foreign strategies and visions towards the middle east did not change in case of the aims especially the leadership of the world. So, the American foreign plans and strategies changed only in the time, the space, and the manner.
Chapter Two: Democracy Promotion in Iraq

Introduction

Iraq is located in the heart of the Middle East, sharing borders with Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, its surface around 435000km2. Its geographical position, which is rich in oil reserves, and relatively large population have long made it of central importance to US interests in the region.

The US first began to increase its relation with Iraq; under the Reagan administration, during the eight years of Iraq-Iranian war. This pattern of engagement continued through the early years of the G.H. W. Bush administration, which sought to maintain Iraq as a counterbalance against Iran. But the nature of the US-Iraqi relationship changed completely after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A US-led coalition, acting under the authority of UN Security Council resolution 678, this resolution led Iraq to withdraw from Kuwaiti territory in 1991. As a result, the following decade witnessed increasing tension between the US and Iraq. The Clinton administration applied a policy of ‘dual containment’ against both Iraq and Iran. Ultimately this policy ended with the invasion of Iraq under G.W. Bush in 2003, which led to the end of Saddam Hussein’s twenty-four-year rule. It also led to a long-term American occupation of the country, amidst efforts to introduce ‘democracy’ to Iraq and the wider region.

This chapter will discuss how the US tried to encourage the emergence of elite-based democracy in Iraq or, in the pursuit of hegemony and how this transformation occurred in the broader region. It will first address the US-Iraqi relationship since 1979, under the Reagan,
G.H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations. The chapter will then analyze the G.W. Bush administration’s approach to Iraq, in terms of the invasion and occupation, and specifically the array of economic, political and civil society reforms introduced as part of the effort to promote democracy in Iraq. Finally, it will assess the extent to which the US strategy of democracy promotion in Iraq was successful or not.

I. The US and Iraq: Relation in the Aftermath of 1979

a) The Regan and G.H.W.Bush Administration:

The Iranian revolution of 1979 paved the way for the development of the US-Iraqi relationship. Ironically, it is the same year that Saddam Hussein formally took the power in Iraq. Like the US-Egyptian relationship, which was founded on Israeli-Egyptian relations, it was an external interest that led the US to made relations with Iraq; namely undermining the revolutionary government of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. This motivation was shared by Hussein, who feared the influence of Iran’s Shiite Islamic doctrine on Iraqi Shias, who formed the majority of Iraq’s population. In 1980 Hussein launched an attack against Iran in an attempt to remove Khomeini and position Iraq as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. President Reagan outlined measures in support of Iraq in a secret National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) as early as 1982, despite maintaining a position of neutrality in public. Reagan also removed Iraq from the State Departments’ list of sponsors of terrorism, apparently, without Congressional approval (Freudenheim 23).

The US over the years effectively supported Iraq, supplying billions of dollars of credits, US military intelligence and advice, and ensuring that necessary weaponry got to Iraq. Reagan and his Vice President G.H. W. Bush’ supported a highly-classified program, “in
which more than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency were secretly providing
detailed information on Iranian deployment, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes
and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq” (Tyler 115). In the face of Iranian advances, US
support ultimately prevented an Iraqi’s defeat. This war lasted until 1988, the longest
conventional war of the twentieth century, with estimated casualties for both sides ranging
from 500,000 to 1.5 million.

The US and Iraq kept a good relation directly after the Iran-Iraq war. In 1989 for
example, President G. H. W. Bush argued that a good relations with Iraq would serve long-
term US interests in the region, and called for the provision of “economic and political
incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase... [US] influence” (NSC 26). This
was accompanied by the export of high technologies to Iraq, supposedly used in its non-
conventional weapons programmers, as well as $1 billion in agricultural loan guarantees (Hurd
90). In August 1990 however, Iraqi forces attacked Kuwait in an attempt to make part of the
Iranian territory. This was motivated by various factors, including a loose historical claim to
Kuwait as part of Ottoman era, its substantial oil reserves, and an Iraqi debt of approximately
$60 billion during the conflict with Iran. The invasion and occupation of Kuwait marked a
break point in US-Iraqi relations. President G. H. W. Bush called for “the immediate,
complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait” (NSC 45). In January
1991, after months of diplomatic argument, a US-led coalition expelled Iraqi forces from
Kuwait and the monarchy was returned to the House of Al-Sabah. Iran was also an important
consideration in this decision. As Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during
the conflict elaborated: “our practical intention was to leave Baghdad enough power to survive as a threat to an Iran that remained bitterly hostile toward the United States” (90).

**b) The Clinton Administration:**

The Clinton administration came to power after the Persian Gulf War, this war between the forces of the United Nations, led by the United States, and those of Iraq that followed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The United Nations forces, called the Coalition, expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait in March 1991. This had been a defining moment in the emergent unipolar system, a test of the US’s predominant position in the ‘new world order. But the lack of an ultimate end to this struggle, let Hussein’s continued to make problem towards the West and especially to US, for many decade. The Clinton administration choice to pursue the ‘dual containment’ of Iraq alongside Iran, replacing the previous strategy of ‘balancing’ one against the other i.e. Iran versus Iraq. In the case of Iraq, this was enforced through an act introduced in the UN in the aftermath of its invasion of Kuwait, as well as the use of occasional military force. For example, when Iraq announced that it would no longer cooperate with UN weapons inspectors in 1998, the US and the UK targeted ‘Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors, or in particular Israel(Clinton).

Despite the policy of dual containment, the Clinton administration dealt with Iraq and Iran differently. Martin Indyk, special assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian affairs and the policy’s main architect, stated: “Dual containment does not mean duplicate containment... each regime presents different challenges to our interests, and we have
developed policies to deal with the specific cases”(3). This was particularly evident with regard to the question of regime change. In contrast to its policy towards Iran, which sought to reform the government, the Clinton administration actively sought to replace Hussein’s regime (Indyk3).

Regime change and democratization in Iraq became the official policy of the US with the passing of the Iraq Liberation Act in October 1998. The US congress had a main statement about Saddam’s regime: “the United States made a huge-efforts to remove the regime lead by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to encourage the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime” (Iraq Liberation Act of 199). This followed a proceeded ratified by Clinton, which make $5,000,000 available for assistance to the Iraqi democratic opposition for such activities as organization, training, communication, developing and implementing agreements among opposition groups. All These movements were all based outside Iraqi territory. Between 1991 and 2003, who awarded grants of $260,000 for media and publishing projects related to Iraq, and $430,000 for projects that included a media and publishing component. The presence of a US-funded “media war” in operation since the first Gulf War, claiming that before the invasion of 2003 at least 27 separate opposition radio stations were broadcasting towards Iraq. However; democracy promotion was not ultimately a major feature of the Clinton administration’s policy towards Iraq. Clinton administration used democracy promotion as tool to have access to Iraqi society itself. Regime change was the primary emphasis, and while reference was made to a transition to democracy, this was largely on the basis that any alternative to Hussein was preferable (Barker 1).

The President Bush’s instructions to develop a plan for a war were given to the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on November 2001. This suggests that the decision was taken two years before the war. All these preparations, the Bush administration and Blair Cabinet decided to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein and replace the whole regime. The main elements of foreign policy available to decision makers are: political, economic, cultural/ideological and military, these elements help them to translate their intentions into war against Iraq. Finally, they used the military option. March 2003, several days before the war, President Bush offered Saddam Hussain and his sons a 48-hour ultimatum to leave Iraq. At 19 March the war started, through the heavy bombing of Baghdad, which called “Shock and Awe.” At the 9th April 2003, the U.S. Marine Corps entered Baghdad, which led to end of the military operations, and officially declared the occupation of Iraq. They called this war Operation Iraqi Freedom”. This war officially ended in August 2010 with President Obama’s declaration that America’s occupation of Iraq was over (Steve 323).

a) American Political attitude of the 2003 War

In order to understand the complex factors contributing to the decision of the 2003 war by the US and the UK, we must go back further and explore post- 9/11 US foreign policy. There were many intelligence reports insisted that al Qaeda would be unable to organize or make an attack like 11 September. Some in the Bush administration thought that Iraq was involved in this attacks (David191). Therefore, Bush’s decision-making was based on his
assumptions (or, at least, that was what he deliberately wanted it to look like) that somehow Saddam Hussain and his regime were behind the attacks on 11 September, or that they were planning for the next attack on the US. Furthermore, President Bush and his adviser assumed that Iraqi regime possessed WMDs; also, they shared WMD technology with Al- Qaeda. Thus, Bush had by then a new strategic mission called “Preventive war” as a President of the US: to prevent another, possibly worse attacks like 9/11th. According to Shiping Tang: “Preventive war is primarily driven by a state’s concern about the (real or perceived) impending adverse shift to relative power’ (84).

Obviously, the purpose of the war had been debatable, since there were many hidden agendas in the Bush administration offensive against Iraq. Assumptions about the reason of the attack were declared while the actual motive behind the war remains hidden.

b) The Declared Motives of the 2003 War

i) Establishment the Democracy in Iraq

The idea that war would bring democracy to the Middle East was no more than just a propaganda, and according to Donald Rumsfeld's statement in an interview a decade later: “The idea that we could fashion a democracy in Iraq seemed to me unrealistic». The Bush administration thought that the transition of Iraq in to a “friendly” democratic new government would be quick and easy, and that Iraq would become a good example that would push for the region and the whole Middle East to transform too (Causes 45).However, the American expectations were wrong; there was a huge- popular support for radical Islamic terrorism according to American view, while the situation in Iraq went from bad to worse, and the mission in Iraq was not short and easy.
According to Joseph Biden the US Vice President: “It is increasingly clear that President Bush does not have a strategy for victory in Iraq. Rather, he hopes to prevent defeat and pass the problem to his successor.” Thus, after the US forces left the country because of President Obama’s decision, Iraq has functioned as a failed democracy. The wrong post-war American planning produced the chaos and instability in the country. Hence, the American democracy project in Iraq failed (Biden JR and Leslie).

ii) Iraqi Regime and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

President Bush was claimed that: “Saddam Hussein is hiding dangerous weapons and is defying the United Nations”. In addition, the British Prime Ministers Tony Blair emphasized many times that Iraqi WMD could be ready to install within forty-five minutes in order to be used against the US and Britain. In June 2003, the Senate Selected Committee on Intelligence began a formal review of U.S. intelligence into existence of Iraqi's WMD programs, and Iraqi's link to the terrorist group. One of its conclusions was “The Committee found significant shortcoming in almost every aspect of the Intelligence Community's human intelligence collection efforts against Iraq's WMD activities, in particular that the Community had no sources collecting against WMD in Iraq” (Leopold).

In 2004, the CIA declared that the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) but with many of vital information being rewriting, which could explain much about the lack of credibility of war decision. In the longtime, all evidence on mobile biological labs, uranium purchases from Niger, and unmanned-aerial-vehicle delivery systems for WMDs proved to have had been false.
In short, the accusations against Iraqi regime were weak. "Nearly two years after the invasion of Iraq, Charles Duelfer leader of the investigative Iraq Survey Group, reported that the search for weapons of mass destruction had been given up and that no stockpiles of weapons had existed in Iraq when Coalition forces invaded"(BBC News.).

iii) **Iraqi Regime and its Links to Al-Qaeda**

One of the war reasons was that Iraq has links to terrorism. The links between the Iraqi regime and these terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda have also been questioned, these facts adding more elements to this broad argument of the primary reasons for the war. In June 2003, the Senate Selected Committee on Intelligence began a formal review of U.S. intelligence into existence of Iraqi’s ties to the terrorist group. One of its conclusions was:

The investigations of the Committee show that the intelligence failures leading up to the war in Iraq were serious and pervasive. So were the failures prior to the September 11 attacks. While the investigations will continue, reform must begin. There can be no delay when the safety and security of America and Americans are at stake. (Congress)

Actually, after more than a decade, there is still no real evidence that Iraqi regime had a link or any kind of cooperation with terrorist organization. Despite the fact that US forces arrested and investigated many of the officers in Saddam Hussein’s intelligence service after the occupation of Iraq, they had found no evidence proving that the Iraqi regime had any kind of link to al-Qaeda. However, they did find information that Iraqi regime had an uneasy relation with terrorist groups with Iraqi security agency even arresting a number of its members before the war; simply because Al Qaeda and its ideas were forbidden in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s regime(Gompert 163).
iv) Oil Thirsty and Monopoly

According to PNAC, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the US military presence in this country gave the significant stage of the US strategy in the region. This war was the result of several decades of strategic thinking and policy making about oil in the region and Iraq. Therefore, oil and war have become increasingly interconnected in the region. As Henner Fürtig put it: “No other region in the world harbors as much of the single-most important natural resource of modern times—liquid hydrocarbons—as the Middle East does, no other region is situated on the borderlines of three different continents (Africa, Asia, and Europe), and no other region is the cradle of all Abraham religions” (209). The Washington Post reported that even as the Bush transition team prepared to take power in 2001, changing Iraq's regime and seizing its oil were already on the table, at the same time they brought in a group of oil executives to advise them on the new Iraqi oil policy. After the occupation of Iraq, the country depends on the US with security issues. Furthermore, the US military forces were the only power able to keep stability and security in the region. The apparent paradox seems to be realized by the new Iraqi politicians, and they took these issues in their considerations while at the same time favoring close partnerships with the famous American Petroleum firms. If they do not so, they will face a lot of political and security problems (CAUS 1265).

The US policy strategies first served American interests. Thus, this policy becomes strategically necessary to secure its access to oil-rich countries. But economic development and oil market expansion cannot be gained through money and politics alone, but through the use of force and going to war, this notion came to life through realism theory view. While, from a security theory point of view, there are some arguments, that the capturing of
Petroleum and oil fields by establishing director imperial control over oil fields in the region has not been part of the America’ strategic logic for war and conflict. But the main reason is protecting oil, oil producer states, and to ensure the flow of oil to the global market. This is a real critical distinction. According to Alan Greenspan:”The Iraq war is largely about oil” (95).

Furthermore, one of the architects of the war at the Bush administration, U.S. Defense Undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz who was a senior member of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), when asked at a security meeting on 31 May 2003 why the US did not attack North Korea after it admitted possessing (WMD) weapons of mass destruction, replied without hesitation: “Iraq floats on oil.” (356). Yet, Petroleum was not the only goal of the 2003 Iraq war, but it was certainly the fundamental one. Consequently, and from a realist perspective to enable the US to use oil as power.

Here, we can adapt a Security theory point of view, which could help us examine the US concerns in the region. Thus, the US policy nowadays is preserving the security not just of Iraq, but of the entire Arab Gulf region and to ensure the flow of Middle Eastern oil, this issue is among the United States’ chief political-economic concerns. America will continue to have a critical interest in keeping the region oil flowing and to increase oil suppliers. Security is an integral part of nation interests, which is to be protected by all means.

Economically speaking, most of Iraq's major known fields are producing or in development yet, though much of its known hydrocarbon resources have not been fully exploited. The West have ensured its access to Iraqi oil and as a result is benefiting greatly from it. “Oil is the most important raw material in the world, in both economic and political terms, and it is likely to remain a key source of energy well into this century” (Ney 64). In fact, industrial powers in
the world will continue to rely on oil as the main driver of the economy in the nearest future, meaning that the presence in the Middle East, which has the largest oil reserves, is fundamental (Mahdi 137).

Map-01—“A visual representation of the established and estimated oil reserves in the subsoil of the Iraqi provinces, for the next 45-50 years.”

III. Regime Change: The Defeat of Saddam Hessian

The beginning of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ in March 2003 witnessed the end of a decade of rising tensions between the US and Iraq. The invasion of Iraq itself was motivated by two principal factors. First, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which led to a dramatic change in US foreign policy. Second, the US had accorded the raise of weapons of
mass destruction an increasingly high profile following September 11, like Iraq, Iran and North Korea as part of an ‘axis of evil’ according to American view.

The G. W. Bush administration completely justified the invasion of Iraq by claiming to link to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism. But behind these direct factors, a number of other objectives supported the invasion. The G. W. Bush administration saw the invasion of Iraq as a unique opportunity to restructure the regional security environment, characterized by the increasingly the policy of ‘dual containment’, and to support the projection of US influence in the Middle East. In geo-strategic terms a US-dominated Iraq would isolate both Iran and Syria, as part of the ‘axis of evil’ according to American view, as well as allowing for the establishment of permanent US bases that would cancel the need for a presence in Saudi Arabia, where the stationing of US troops after 1991.

Finally, the Administration saw the invasion of Iraq as an opportunity to start a fundamental transformation of both Iraq and the broader Middle East. With indication to the neo-conservative movement, which had a significant presence in the G. W. Bush administration, this can be seen as a continuation of its essential aim “to advance a foreign policy agenda that seeks to remake substantial parts of the world in America’s image”(Halper 35).In the Middle East this was to be achieved by fixing the region’s ‘democratic deficit’, something the Administration had declared as the central target for the attacks of September 11. President G. W. Bush called for “a new Arab charter that champions internal reform, greater politics participation, economic openness, and free trade” (Bush).

Beyond the aim of removing Hussein from power, the G. W. Bush administration saw the invasion of Iraq as an opportunity to democratize the Iraqi state, and by example the
region. This reflected a fundamental belief that the successful introduction of liberal democratic political values and free market economic principles in Iraq, in other words America’s ideology, would eventually guide the other nation across the region and in the process, achieve hegemony in the Middle East.

United States drove coalition battled, which began on March 20, 2003 and ended with the fall of Baghdad on April 9. Aided primarily by the UK, the US rapidly advanced against Baghdad and successfully removes the Ba’ath party’s political and military core, which led almost overnight to the collapse of Hussein’s rule. Days after the major combats President G. W. Bush’s declared on May that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended”. The start of the US occupation was marked by widespread raiding across Iraq, which targeted all aspects of the state, led to a general collapse of public order. The extent of this collapse was largely unanticipated by the US, and in part reflected its failure to sufficiently plan for the post-combat phase of the occupation. General Wesley Clark notes that: “When planning finally began... it was based on the assumption that a US invasion would be welcomed as a liberation by most Iraq’s” (721). This assumption proved largely incorrect. While Hussein’s overthrow was initially wildly popular, it was quickly changed by the realities of the occupation—extreme shortages of water, food, electricity and security (Bush).

The US had underestimated the importance of the reconstruction process required in Iraq after years of conflict and sanctions. Nigel Alwyn Foster argues that: “a moment of opportunity was missed immediately after the toppling of Saddam’s regime: that fleeting chance to restore law and order, maintain the momentum, nurture popular support and thus extinguish the inevitable seeds of insurgency sown amongst the ousted-ruling elite” (5). Thus,
the conflict began between the US and an Iraqi insurgency, this include of a group of Sunni
Ba’athists cooperating with Al-Qaeda. It threatened to destroy the US intervention in Iraq, and
furthermore, destabilizes the entire region, which placed the US’s position as a policeman in
the Middle East.

IV. Democracy Promotion in Iraq in Post 9/11th

President Bush on March 19, 2003 launched “Operation Iraqi Freedom” after a
warning given to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within 48 hours or face war and the USA
and its allies, including Britain and Australia, invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam
Hussein’s government. The operation was the largest special operations force since the
Vietnam War and among its objectives was to end the rule of Saddam Hussein, search for
Iraqi’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and the most important thing is to secure
Iraqi oil fields and also to help the people of Iraq create an environment suitable for a
democratic government (Pike).

The two major reasons behind this invasion were that Saddam Hussein’s links to
terrorists and the perceived Iraqi production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). In
the 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush remarked that the USA knows Iraq
had several mobile biological weapons developed in the 1990s,and then Secretary of State
Colin Powell also presented a report to the UN in 2003 to show that Iraq apparently had
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CNN).US officials also claimed that Saddam Hussein had
a secret relationship with the terrorist group Al-Qaeda, which masterminded the attacks of
9/11 (Hayes 44).However, when these two principal factors for the invasion were not
convinced, democracy promotion in Iraq only became the central justification given by the Bush administration for the invasion (Hobson, March 40).

To this end, President Bush in a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy in 2003 called for democracy promotion in Iraq, a “strategy of freedom in the Middle East” which “will be an important event for how democracy evolves and spreads throughout the world” (Bush). He also remarked in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute that “the world has an interest in spreading democracy because freedom and stability helps countries avoid hateful ideologies” (Bush).

The need to promote democracy in Iraq was also apparently driven by the Bush Administration’s desire to transform the whole Middle Eastern region into a democratic center to address the so-called lack of democracy in the region, integrate the Middle East into the world economic system, build a strong civil society with the help of elites or intellectuals in order to exercise a hegemony over the masses and finally prevent the rise of a regional power as a step to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict which will all help promote stability and protect American interests in the region and the world as a whole (Robinson 441-442).

If we look to this strategy, the USA proposed to create an internal system or structure of domination based on the promotion of democracy, civilized the political and civil societies of Iraq as well as its economy through privatizations of course with help of intellectuals to lead and the government, building a civil society base that will support the new government through puppet organizations, suppressing alternate political voices as well as funding local media to help in propaganda issues (Robinson 442-447), and this scenario is what Gramsci (1971) argued as the dominant class organizing and centralizing certain elements within the political and civil society to assume control over society and spread their definition of reality.
on the masses thereby leading to the acceptance of this concept and its acceptance as the common sense or the natural thing which leads to hegemony (Robinson).

The promotion of democracy in Iraq was therefore according to Robinson based on encouragement the elite in the target country such Iraq by cultivating changes in the political and civil society aspects of the Iraqi society. The move which is mentioned above also reflected the democracy promotion strategy in the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2002/2006 documents which urged the USA to promote democracy through all available means. The Bush administration used many tools and channels and build democratic infrastructure in other countries. Gramsci also noted is key in the quest for hegemony through consensus and not force because it aims at promoting an ideology with the aim to dominate all aspects of social life in the country. (Robinson 20). The USA therefore used the same strategy to take control of the Iraqi media and educational system in order to ensure the rapid acceptance of the liberal democratic ideology by the Iraqi people and the result is strengthening the American hegemony.

The Bush administration wanted to control the political institutions of Iraq, by using a number of Iraqi exiled elites and intellectuals. The Americans formed a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to take control over the political scene of Iraq to ensure the promotion of the liberal democracy ideology so as to bring about stability in order to ensure Iraq remained a leading oil supplier to the world (Robinson 446).

The use of these intellectuals to govern also gave the USA total control over the direction the country should take because every decision and policy was determined by these intellectuals who made up the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). These intellectuals are who Robinson called “agents of influence” (445). They serve as leaders in the political and
civil arenas and are expected by the USA to convince the masses in Iraq to conform to the new ideology being promoted in order to get the country integrated into the global capitalist system and thereby help strengthen the USA’s hegemony.

The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was also created by the CPA and consisted of various political figures in Iraq who were appointed by the CPA to advice the authority and most of them like Ahmed Chalabi, Ayad Allawi were sympathetic to US interests. The council was therefore seen as a puppet in the hands of the CPA and an extension to the USA, because members of the council were selected and not elected and also members spent more time on their self-interests than that of Iraq’s future thereby helping further America’s hegemonic ambitions in Iraq.

The CPA aimed at making the Iraqi economy into a liberal market economy because, it was only with this reform that the promotion of the liberal democratic ideology would work; remarking that “the first priority of the CPA was to get the Iraqi people and its economy back to work because if the economy is not on track, changes in other institutions simply won’t work” (Dobbins el 198). Introducing and ensuring that the liberal democratic ideology works requires a strong liberal economic environment. This is also part of the fusion of liberal market changes with liberal democracy which helps promote a political market economy which helps furthers America’s hegemony(Dobbins, Jones 62).

The CPA modeled the Iraqi economy on the American capitalist system and therefore, planned its economic policies with minimal input. The Iraqis themselves even though the policies were criticized as being too centered on the oil sector neglecting other equally productive areas of the Iraqi economy. The Authority was also criticized by law experts for having no authority to even implement these economic changes in the first place due to their
nature as a body working for an occupy enforce, and these policies were only aimed to further American interests and not that of Iraqis. These economic changes led to more than 500,000 Iraqi workers out. It marginalized of many Iraqi businessmen, thereby making the economy over-reliant on American investments (Thorn).

The CPA and its implementing partners mostly USAID, as a move to strengthen civil participation in governance, managed the creation of democratic town councils with the help of its professional advisors. This process was seen as undemocratic because local elections were a better alternative and also it opened up the doors for US corporate interests to take over in Iraq(Blum 179-184).

The USA used organizations and individuals who clearly were corrupted to implement its civil society program in Iraq because these intellectuals and organizations were loyal to the USA. The Americans tried to keep its interests by using the Iraqi politicians to carry out the changes in Iraq; it provided them with complete control of all facets of Iraq to help strengthen their hegemony. These individuals and organizations were used by the USA to introduce, spread and ensure support for the liberal democratic ideology which in turn gave them total control over the country. Some of these intellectual was Dr. Mowaffak Baqer al-Rubai, an Iraqi medical doctor who was educated in Britain and served as a member of the Iraqi Governing Council and also as the National Security Advisor in Iraq in 2003(Sourcewatch 30).

Additionally, organizations like the NED, USAID which were involved in US democracy programs in other countries like Haiti and Panama before Iraq, were also seen as puppet organizations with strong ties to the US government. These organizations interests and due to this and their past records with democracy promotion including destabilizing
governments and funding opposition groups and parties in other countries. These organizations and programs planned and implemented in the civil society and education sectors, that could be seen as helping the USA to strengthen its control over the institutions in that particular society due to their loyalty to the US and its interests (Shaw).

The USA through the CPA and other partner agencies made wide scale changes in the Iraqi media and the educational system, which are important aspects of civil society. They are described as a key in manipulating public opinion and therefore, central to the hegemonic process also. The media constitutes both the framework of contemporary civil society which has the power to influence perspectives (Shaw15).

In October, 2002 even before the invasion of Iraq, the USA founded the Office of Special Plans (OSP) under the Department of Defense to create a clear image for the Iraqi media which is an important part of civil society. The OSP made a conjunction with a department in the Pentagon which specialized in psychological warfare, the two bodies worked together to create the Rapid Reaction Media Team (RRMT). The RRMT became the basis of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN). The Iraqi government created company for several media which was established by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid (ORHA) in order to control the public and privet media (Al Rawi 47).

The RRMT had a mission which was creating a bridge between the State controlled media network and the new media. The USA founded TV and radio stations like Radio Sawa and the Al Hurrah TV station as well as numerous newspapers which the USA established after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein with the aim of attracting younger audiences in Iraq and the Middle East and opening them up to American culture and values and encouraging them to accept these values. This team dissolved the Iraqi Ministry of Information which it
described as a tool for oppression and set out a strategy to broadcast programs which constantly portrayed Saddam Hussein as a blood thirsty and corrupted President (Dalacoura 964).

The Iraqi media network (IMN) which operated most of the media that was founded by the USA after the invasion was mostly controlled or managed by Iraqi exiles like Shameem Rassam, George Mansour and Ahmed Al-Rikabi who were all known to be sympathetic to US interests and ideologies (Al Rawi 49). The IMN was established to increase US control over Iraq and help the people of Iraq’s acceptance to the actions of the USA in that country through the use of trained Iraqi media teams by US advisors who portrayed the future of Iraq in the Education textbooks with reference to Saddam Hussein or his Ba’ath Party were removed. Iraqi history was presented differently in classrooms after the invasion. Old textbooks were replaced with new ones; with new syllabus containing democratic values as the main theme. Anything with reference to Islam or anti-American was removed. This was seen as a way to rebuild the educational sector in order to prepare the next generations of Iraqis to practice democracy or the liberal democratic ideology that the USA was imposing on the country. The USA built a strong foundation of democracy in the future of Iraqi civil society, a move which will see Iraqi’s acceptance the ‘common sense’ of liberal democracy introduced by the USA. This strategy which according to Gramsci will lead to the achievement of hegemony because America will gain a consensual social control over the Iraqi people through the education system and other areas of social life in the country.

Finally, Robinson argued that as part of its strategy to use democracy promotion to ensure and increase its dominance over Iraq society, the USA controlled the other popular
independent voices initiative within Iraqi society which from developing to oppose the US program, in other words to keep Iraq under the American control.

The acceptance of the liberal democratic ideology as the common sense by Iraq was evidenced in the agreement made in 2007 between the Bush Administration and the Maliki government called the Declaration of Principles. The declaration gave the USA the rights to install military bases around Iraq, perform combat operations when they wanted and also ensure western oil companies have inhibited access to Iraq’s vast oil resources even after the USA leaves Iraq (Chomsky20).

This agreement helped the USA stabilize the world oil supplies by ensuring a fixed flow of oil from the Iraqi to the world markets and this also provided a lot of revenue for Anglo-American oil companies like Halliburton, Emerson, British Petroleum and ExxonMobil. This helped to protect US energy interests in Iraq and the Middle East as a whole as well as to increase these western economies. Indeed, General John Abizaid, former commander of US Central Command in Iraq remarked in an interview that the Iraq war and subsequent occupation by the USA was about the need to control Iraqi oil reserves and even though the USA itself has imported a large amount of Iraqi oil, the revenue did not reflect on the Iraqi economy(Isakhan 4).

John Judis argued that the neo-conservative elements in the Bush administration believed that taking control of Iraq and its vast oil reserves will seriously damage the influence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); which will give the US much more power and influence in determining world oil prices. That would give USA a full hegemonic position in the world (23).
Even after the USA declared their intention to withdraw their military and other personnel out of Iraq in 2011, they are still controlling Iraq’s oil reserves and in charge of protecting Iraqi airspace, through the over 20,000 and strong personnel and military bases they left behind. This is due mainly due to the fact that control of Iraq’s vast oil reserves gives America leverage in maintaining their strong hold on Middle Eastern politics and effects their dominant position in the world (RT 11).

This clearly shows that democracy promotion efforts and its helper changes was stolen by the USA in Iraq after the invasion in the political, civil society, economy, media and Education sectors. The Americans tried to spreading their ideology through the use of intellectuals and organizations loyal to US interests to gain control of all aspects of the country including its vast oil reserves, a situation described by Gramsci (1971) as hegemonic. This situation gave the USA total access to Iraq’s vast oil reserves, which helped the USA to be an even more vital player in the vastly important and influential global energy Market.

In conclusion, the NSS documents of 2002 and 2006 called for the promotion of democracy, by America through all available means to ensure stability and protection of its interest, in order to maintain its leading position in the international political system. In the case of Iraq, the interests centered around oil and having a stronger influence on Middle East politics.

V. The Iraq War and its Impact on the US Democratization Project in the Middle East

The Bush administration claimed that “democratizing” Iraq would be a good example of democracy for people in the Middle East. But the American military intervention in Iraq
made the US's lost its credibility in promoting democracy across the Arab world because this war was seen as illegal and unnecessary. Further still, the Iraq war caused enormous damage to the legitimacy of the very idea of democracy promotion. In effect, toppling the Iraqi regime through military intervention led to widespread skepticism about democratic policy in the Arab world and has even been viewed as ‘unwise’ (Dunne 25). In relation to this it is believed that the US's ‘hard’ pressure to change the Iraqi regime cast fears on the real intentions behind US democracy promotion. Carothers states, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

The Bush administration’s emphasis on the Iraq war as the leading wedge of its democracy promotion policy in the Middle East has closely associated democracy promotion with the assertion of American military power and security interests. With the U.S. intervention in Iraq viewed as illegitimate in most parts of the world, the legitimacy of the general concept of democracy promotion has suffered accordingly. (Carothers 6)

Also, the terrible adventure in Iraq has made democracy promotion in the Middle East equal with forceful regime change. The ongoing instability in Iraq has produced a reaction against the democratization project in the Middle East. Hence, the US link between democracy and military intervention has destroyed the attractiveness of the freedom agenda. As one scholar noted, ‘it is more than advisable not to justify applying coercive means in the fight against “rogue states” and terrorist groups with the argument of promoting democracy in the region’ (Jung 182). So, Iraq's insecurity and the continued instability has been a danger for the American democratic project and therefore; the US military's intervention in Iraq in the name of promoting democracy has killed the idea.
The insecurity in Iraq has not motivated the other governments in the Gulf region to follow the Iraqi style and “certainly Iraq was not the best candidate to be a pilot model of secular Arab democracy, to be emulated by other Arab states” (Halabi 131). Furthermore, the Iraqi developments have shown the dangers of pursuing real political openness, to say nothing of the uncertainties of the outcomes of such changes. So, deep political reform in the Middle East could bear undesired potential consequences; it may affect the stability of the region on the one hand, and could harm the US’s principal strategic interests with its Arab Gulf allies on the other hand. It is clear that the American freedom agenda that hoped to spread across the Arab world has been failed by the Iraq war, and therefore Iraq constitutes a slow down the promotion of democracy in the Gulf region.

When we take the Iraqi experience as an example, it is clear that the Middle East regimes are not ready to create major domestic political change. Obviously, the invasion and occupation of Iraq, was the main factor for limiting reform measures in the Middle East countries. Hence, the Middle East rulers have seen the distraction of security situation in Iraq ‘as an obstacle to the introduction of further reforms. Saudi Arabia, for instance, perceived Iraq's democratic experiment as an evidence of the unrealistic rhetoric of promoting democracy in the region. The Middle East traditional polities, economic resources (vast oil reserves) and the United States commitment to providing security and stability in the Gulf have all been against the democracy promotion efforts and have contributed to the flexibility of the Gulf regimes.

**Conclusion**

The US policy-makers used many methods to achieve real national security as a rationale for its drive toward more expanding hegemony in the whole world. These factors led
to the notion that the great superiority of the US will oblige others to respect America's needs and desires whether for cheap oil. The main target for US is to ensure the security of its allies especially Israel, more military bases and commitment of its strategic security policy, which achieve its goals to gain more bases in the Middle East, the Arabian peninsula and the whole world. Despite the defeat of Iraqi military forces, an insurgency and resistance had continued an intense guerrilla war in the most of the Iraqi cities in the years since President Bush announced military victory with the famous statement: “Mission accomplished.”(147).the war drove Iraq into chaos, resulting in years of deadly violence and the rise of the Islamic State (IS). Tens of thousands of Iraqis, more than four thousand American troops and one hundred eighty individuals of British service members were all killed in the lengthy conflict, as well as millions of Iraqi civilian deaths and displacements until this moment. Furthermore, this war has left thousands of wounded and physically challenged individuals on both sides of the conflict.
General Conclusion

Without doubt that the USA has in one way or another promoted democracy in different countries like the Philippines, Nicaragua and Panama despite the arguments and evidences against the strategy undertaken, and mostly with aim of protecting its interests in order to preserve and insure its primacy toward other countries or in particular the hopeless countries like Latin America or Arab Middle East.

The USA made democracy promotion an essential part of its foreign policy in the 1980s. The country gradually sought to distance itself from support of repressive regimes in order to create a clean image and ensure even more worldwide stability due to the gradual growth of globalization in the 1980s. This key shift was also a move to defeat the Soviet ideology of communism which was spreading in Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East, a situation which threatened American interests and therefore; its hegemony. The real motives behind democracy promotion efforts has been aimed at expanding American imperialism even if through a cleverer way so as to consolidate their primacy and protect their interests through the stability these democracy promotion efforts create.

After the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the Bush Administration, democracy promotion became a key justification for the war especially; after other factors like Weapons of Mass Destruction production and the supported of terrorists by the Hussein regime could not be proved. To this end the Bush administration published two National Security documents (NSS 2004 AND 2006) which provided the foreign policy goals of the administration which included democracy promotion around the world as a means for America to strengthen its primacy.
The documents stated that the USA needed to promote democracy all around the globe as democracy represented American values and the best form of government for every society. American democracy has two sides; one which is bright and shining which would help countries to ensure stability and have a bitter life, following the American model. But the other side hides America’s desire to secure its interests all over the world.

Finally, the USA democracy promotion efforts in Iraq was a move to strengthen its hegemony that supports the assumption in the introduction. The USA and because of its past records in countries like Panama, Nicaragua promoted an ideology (liberal democracy) as the best form of government. the Iraqi people despite the critique against exporting democracy from USA which gave her the advantages to gained control over the political, economic, civil society, educational and media institutions in the country through the use of intellectuals subversive to US interests and suppressed opposing voices which gave them means to take absolute control over that country. This control in turn gave the USA authority over Iraqi’s strategic oil reserves and the general direction the country should go, thereby helping the USA strengthen its hegemonic position in the Middle East.
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