
A ‘Memoire’ Submitted to the Faculty of Letters and Languages, Department of English in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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by

DIB Fatima Zohra

Board of Examiners:

Dr. MAAMERI Fatima, Director

M. FILALI Billel, Member

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ABSTRACT

This research work is an attempt to appraise the United States’ foreign policy in Africa and its impact on Algerian national security. After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. changed its views about this continent and it became increasingly involved in its affairs. The reasons for elevating Africa to the level of U.S. national interest were oil and terrorism. These two reasons are interrelated in the sense that terrorism has legitimized U.S. militarization of Africa. The true reason behind American policy in Africa, however, is to establish a military presence in the continent under the excuse of terrorism and this for self-interested reasons. Indeed, terrorism was a mere fabrication that was constructed by the U.S. in order to meet its interests in the region. For the U.S. was to militarize Africa to secure its energy supplies. In this, it sought cooperation with Algeria that was already battling terrorism. During the 1970s, Algeria had acquired an international status as a defender of a new international order, a role that did not go unnoticed by the United States. For the latter, the importance of Algeria as a strategic partner on the African continent cannot be neglected, first as a supplier of LNG and second as a country with a long experience in counterterrorism. This, however, led to negative impacts particularly with the Malian crisis of 2012 which began by the MNLA’s declaration of independence from the government of Bamako and ended with the total dominance of the Islamist groups over Northern Mali. This condition led to direct consequences on Algeria which culminated in the hostage-taking crisis of Tiguentourine.
RESUME

المتخصّص

إن هذا البحث هو محاولة لفهم سياسة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في إفريقيا وتأثيراتها على الأمن القومي الجزائري. بعد أحداث 11-09-2001 غيرت الولايات المتحدة موقفها اتجاه القارة الإفريقية وأصبحت جد مهتمة بقضاياها. الأسباب من وراء هذا الاهتمام هي الانتهاز والإرهاب. هذا السببين متراطبان حيث إن الإرهاب ساعد الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية على إثبات تواجدها العسكري. فالسبب الحقيقي لسياسة أمريكا في إفريقيا هو التواجد العسكري بحجة الإرهاب. وبالتالي خدمة مصالحها الشخصية، فالإرهاب كان مجرد اختراق قامت به الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية من أجل مصالحها في المنطقة أي التواجد العسكري من أجل حماية مصالحها الطاقوية ومن أجل هذا لجأت إلى التعاون مع الجزائر والتي كانت السباقة في مكافحة الإرهاب.

خلال سنوات 1970 وحظيت الجزائر بمكانة المدافع عن النظام الدولي الحديث، هذه الدور لقي اهتمام الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية حيث أدركت مكانة الجزائر كعنصر استراتيجي أول كمزود بالغاز الطبيعي الممنوع، وبالتالي كانت لديه من الخبرة الكافية في مكافحة الإرهاب. لكن هذا أدى إلى انعكاسات سلبية من بينها الأزمة المالية 2012 والتي بدأت بإعلان حركة الأزواد استقلالها عن حكومة بماكرو وانتهت بسيطرة الجماعات الإسلامية على شمال مالي. هذا الوضع أثر على الجزائر بشكل مباشر وانتهى بأزمة رهائن تيتنورين.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my endearing parents,

Husband, daughter, brothers, sisters and friends.

To Allah’s Mercy upon Mankind, to the Prophet Muhammad Peace be upon him
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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# ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA:</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance</td>
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<td>AQC:</td>
<td>Al Qaeda Central</td>
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<td>AQIM:</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>CAERT:</td>
<td>African Center for Studies and Research on Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF_HOA:</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>CEOG:</td>
<td>Comité d’Etat Major Opérationnel Conjoint</td>
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<td>CTSP:</td>
<td>Comité de Transition pour le Salut du People</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD:</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRS:</td>
<td>Direction des Renseignements et de la Sécurité</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIAA:</td>
<td>Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azward</td>
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<td>FMF:</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales Financing</td>
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<td>FMS:</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<td>FTA:</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>FY:</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GIA:</td>
<td>Groupe Islamique Armé</td>
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<td>GPOI:</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative</td>
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<td>GSPC:</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
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<td>GWOT:</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorist</td>
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<td>IMET:</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<td>JTFAS:</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Aztec Silence</td>
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<td>LNG:</td>
<td>Liquified Natural Gas</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDJT:</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la Démocratie et Justice au Tchad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEPI:</td>
<td>Middle East Partnership Initiative</td>
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<td>MNLA:</td>
<td>National Movement of Liberation of the Azwad</td>
</tr>
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<td>MPA:</td>
<td>Mouvement Populaire de l’Azwad</td>
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<td>MUJAO:</td>
<td>Movement of Oneness and Jihad in West Africa</td>
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<td>NEPDG:</td>
<td>National Energy Policy Development Group</td>
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<td>OEF-TS:</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom- Trans Sahara</td>
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<td>PSI:</td>
<td>Pan Sahel Initiative</td>
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<td>PSPSDN:</td>
<td>Special Program for Peace, Security and Development in the North</td>
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TIFA: Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
UNODC: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
USA: United States of America
US-AFRICOM: United States Africa Command
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
US-EUCOM: United States European Command
USNAEP: United States- North African Economic Partnership
WMDs: Weapons of Mass Destruction
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General Conclusion
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The African continent has been regarded as ‘back water’ in U.S. diplomatic circles. This lack of interest about this continent was changed immediately after Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington for two interlinked reasons: oil and the potential terrorist threat. The 9/11 events and its aftermath posed a great threat to U.S. energy supplies. As a result, the U.S. became in an increased need to secure its energy resources and the African continent was the solution to this problem. To do so, the Bush Administration used the Global War on Terror to safeguard its interests in the continent. In other words, Washington used the excuse of terrorism to justify its militarization of Africa and thus would be able to secure its energy supplies. Indeed, it launched the Sahelian Sahara as a ‘new front’ in the war on terror. This alleged ‘front’ has left negative impacts on the peoples of the region on one side, and the stability and political security of the region, on the other. The current situation in Northern Mali is as one of the outcomes of U.S. policy in the region. In this context, this research work investigates the impacts of U.S. policy in Africa and mainly the impact of the Malian crisis on Algerian national security.

This ‘Memoire’ addresses various purposes. The first is to highlight U.S. Policy in Africa with emphasis on two issues, which are oil and terrorism. The second aim is to understand U.S. - Algerian relations in counterterrorism after the 9/11 events. The last objective is to discuss the Malian crisis and its impact on the security of Algeria.
Therefore, it pursues answering the following questions: Why did the U.S. increase its interest about the African continent after the 9/11? How did the terrorism excuse help the U.S. legitimize its militarization of Africa? Finally, taking the Malian crisis into consideration, what is the impact of U.S. African policy on Algerian security?

This ‘Mémoire’ investigates the impact of U.S. foreign policy in Africa on Algerian national security. Indeed, it demonstrates that the U.S. policy in Africa is largely aimed at establishing military presence in the continent for the sake of protecting its interests. Using the Sahara Sahel as a ‘Second front’ on Global War on Terror, it justified its militarization of Africa. The Malian Crisis (2012), which was the result of U.S. policy in Africa, had affected Algerian national security (the Tiguentourine attacks).

The ‘Mémoire’ depends both on the descriptive and analytical approaches. It accounts for and analyzes U.S. policy in Africa and its interests in the region and investigates U.S.-Algerian relations and the impact of the Malian crisis on Algerian security.

The ‘Mémoire’ depends on primary and secondary sources; however, little is written about this topic, mainly books. To begin, I read several articles from social anthropologist Jeremy Keenan, whose current topic of focus is security and counterterrorism in North Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel. In his writing, he analyzed how the U.S. used the fight against terrorism in order to legitimize its military presence on the continent. Books published on the topic of the impact of U.S. policy in Africa on Algerian national security are a few. Therefore, this work relied more on personal analysis and deductions.
The Memoire consists of three chapters. The first chapter tackles U.S. interests in Africa and considers three points. At first, it deals with U.S. energy policy in Africa by examining American attempts to secure access to African oil and relates it to its national security. In a second part, it examines the U.S. use of a second front in the war on terror in the Sahara Sahel as justification to secure its energy supplies from the continent. Finally, it tackles the U.S. militarization of Africa through initiatives such as the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) and AFRICOM and assesses their impact on the people of the region.

The second chapter deals with the Malian crisis and focuses mainly on the situation in northern Mali. For that, it provides a general background about the region, i.e. its geography and sociology; these are important to understand the roots of the crisis. Then, it moves to identify threats to regional security including trafficking, terrorism and rebellions and analyses their impact on the local communities and the region at large.

The third chapter deals U.S.-Algerian relations: first, it tackles in brief the economic ties between the two countries and highlights the hydrocarbon sector as the main interest of U.S. investment. Then it will move to discuss U.S. - Algerian cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Finally, it tackles the Malian Crisis and its impact on Algerian national security and underlines how counterterrorism helped foster relations between the two countries.
CHAPTER ONE:

UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFRICA

Introduction:

Africa has traditionally had a marginal and decreasing role in international affairs and this led the U.S. to pay little attention to its security issues. The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, however, changed U.S. views about the continent and it became increasingly involved in African affairs. This growing interest is due to two interlinked reasons that are oil and the fight against terrorism.

The first chapter, divided into three points, tackles U.S. interests in Africa. At first, it deals with U.S. oil policy in Africa. By examining U.S. attempts to secure access to African oil, the chapter appraises its importance for American national security. The chapter then moves to the second interest of U.S. in Africa, which is the fight of terrorism. It examines how the U.S. used the second front in the war on terror in the Sahara Sahel as a justification to secure its energy supplies from the continent. For this reason, it details how the U.S. fabricated terrorism in the Sahel in the form of a hostage-taking incident. It also scrutinizes the impact of this deception on the people of the region. Finally, it tackles the U.S. militarization of Africa, a consequence of its growing involvement by dealing with militarizing initiatives such as the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) and AFRICOM and their impact on the people of the region.
1. **U.S. Policy on African Oil**

1. **The Cheney Report**

   Current American policy on African oil is based on a report made up by the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) in May 2001. The NEPDG was appointed by President George W. Bush and chaired by his vice President Dick Cheney. The Report usually referred to as the “Cheney Report,” sheds the light on U.S. energy needs and sees that the government should undertake certain initiatives to satisfy American energy demands. These initiatives include increasing oil output from U.S. domestic sources as well as increasing imported quantities of oil and gas from foreign sources.

   Since Africa is able to increase its oil output in the coming years, the Report indicates the importance of the continent in meeting the future demands of U.S. energy supplies. “West Africa is expected to be one of the fastest, growing sources of oil and natural gas for the American market,” the Report states. In addition, it singles out the high quality of African oil since it is low in sulfur. For this reason, it recommends to the government to encourage American companies to increase their investment in oil production on the African continent (Klare and Volman 612).

   Moreover, the Report points out that through the “diversification” of oil production, the U.S. will be able to secure its growing demands (Volman 574). This is part of a Bush administration strategy, which seeks to reduce its reliance on the Middle Eastern oil and to find other alternatives (other producing areas). According to the Report, the concentration of oil production in one region creates market instability, and it is only through this strategy that the U.S. would solve its energy needs. To do so, the government ought to encourage greater oil production
throughout the world to enhance the diversity of sources for oil available for import. This emphasis on diversity has led the Bush Administration to devote its attention to several other oil-producing areas among them Africa. Here the Report focused on six major countries, which are Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea to promote greater diversity of oil supplies.

The Report also focuses on the Sub Saharan Africa and stated that will be the source of future U.S. oil supplies. This is why the Bush administration defined it as a “strategic national interest.” For instance, it projected that by 2020, U.S. energy consumption would increase by about 32 percent and by 2015, 25 percent of U.S. imported oil would come from the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, the U.S. would be importing from Africa more than from the Persian Gulf (Keenan 16).

In addition to that, the Report highlights the obstacles that face the transfer, the import and the investment in oil production. Those obstacles include corruption, political instability lack of the rule of law, and ethnic and religious conflicts. According to the Report, the government should undertake certain measures to overcome this challenge. So, the NEPDG suggested that the involved Secretaries of State, Energy, and Commerce should cooperate to create the suitable conditions for U.S. oil and gas trade, investment and operations, recast the Joint Economic Partnership with Nigeria—the major oil producer, and encourage the adequate use of oil resources in the African producer countries (613).

As a result, many efforts have been made to put those suggestions into action. For example, the Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham met with his African counterparts in the third annual meeting of the African energy ministers in Casablanca to discuss the ways that would enhance the investment climate for U.S.
companies. To enhance further U.S. access, the Bush administration has also sought to reopen the doors of investment for U.S. oil companies in Libya and Sudan. So far, the U.S. have prevented energy investment and trade with these two countries claiming that Libya supports terrorism and pursues the production of WMDs\(^1\) and Sudan violates human rights in Darfur\(^2\) (Klare and Volman 614).

2. U.S. National Security and African Oil:

In order to insure increasing oil imports and access to as many sources as possible, the U.S. focused its attention on Africa and defined its oil as a 'vital national security interest' of the United States. Maintaining and expanding access to African oil became a central concern of the Bush Administration and mainly the Department of Defense, which planned to secure U.S. energy interests. As a result, it launched military and security assistance programs. It is doing this through the following channels: The first of these is the sale of arms to African governments through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and the Commercial Sales program. The second is the provision of military training, education programs both in Africa and in the United States for African troops, and officers through the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance program (ACOTA) and the African Regional Peacekeeping (ARP) Program. Finally, the U.S. conducts joint military exercises with military forces throughout the continent in order to train local forces and to enhance the ability of U.S. forces to engage in military operations in Africa. The largest portions of U.S. aid to Africa are being directed to Angola and Nigeria, the two leading African oil suppliers to the USA (Keenan 576).
U.S. transfer of arms and military equipment to African states through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Sales Financing (FMF) programs. These entail the sale of U.S. arms and military equipment by the DOD to friendly countries, in some cases facilitated by the provision of U.S. credits via the FMF program. Major recipients included Djibouti, Kenya, Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Uganda. Several African countries have also purchased U.S. arms and equipment directly from private U.S. arm producers under licenses issued by the State Department through the Commercial Sales program. Major African beneficiaries of this program in recent years have included Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda (617).

Most African countries participate in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, under which the USA provides instruction in combat and technical skills for African officers and enlisted personnel at bases in the USA and abroad. In recent years, the DOD has allocated around $10 million per year to provide training to some 1300 to 1700 Africa personnel. This assistance, however, is not sufficient to enhance the African troops and provide them with the necessary training and education. For instance, major recipients in FY 2006 include Algeria ($750 000), Angola ($400 000), Chad ($250 000), Cote d'Ivoire ($50 000), Democratic Republic of Congo ($150 000), Republic of Congo ($100 000), Eritrea ($450 000), Ethiopia ($600 000), Gabon ($200 000), Nigeria ($800 000), and Sao Tome ($200 000). The DOD also announced plans to initiate new IMET programs in Equatorial Guinea and Sudan (618).

To enhance further the ability of African military forces to protect access to oil resources, the Bush administration established the African Contingency
Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program to improve the ability of African troops to participate in peacekeeping operations. It will also provide equipment appropriate to peace support operations, such as a comprehensive communications package, portable electric power generators, mine detectors, night vision devices, portable light sets, and water purification units. In FY 2006, Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) has replaced ACOTA. The Bush administration has also requested $41 million in FY 2006 for the Africa Regional Peacekeeping to support operations in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sudan, and to strengthen the peacekeeping forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Klare and Volman 618)

3. Expanding U.S. Naval Operations in Africa:

The U.S. navy has significantly increased its presence in African waters and much of its operation focused in the Gulf of Guinea (offshore oil reserves). The U.S. navy has also conducted joint training operations with the naval forces of African states. For example in July 2004, the U.S. navy carried out the 'Summer Pulse 04' exercise. The exercise, which entailed simulated air and sea combat, involved over 20 000 military personnel aboard 30 ships with the participation of nine African countries.

Moreover, the U.S. Navy launched a two-month 'Gulf of Guinea Deployment' with participation by the USS Emory S Land, carrying about 1400 sailors and Marines. The deployment was the direct result of the 2004 Maritime Security Conference held in Naples. It involved port calls at Douala, Cameroon; Port Gentil, Gabon; and Sekondi, Ghana. Instructors and sailors from Cameroon, Sao Tome, Gabon, Ghana and Benin also participated in the operation. A second Gulf of Guinea
deployment was conducted in May -July 2005, with participation by the U.S. Coast
Guard Cutter Bear (619).

4. The Search for Bases in Africa:

The USA has negotiated agreements granting it access to airfields and other
facilities in several African nations. These facilities are often referred to as 'lily pad'
facilities. A series of such facilities, technically called “secure co-operation locations,”
are being established to refuel aircraft, temporarily house soldiers, store equipment,
or conduct intelligence operation. They are not full military bases because U.S. forces
can occupy them only when necessary. They allow in Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld’s words, “freedom of action” in responding to internal conflicts and to
security and terrorist threats. They include Entebbe Airport in Uganda; an airfield
near Bamako, the capital of Mali; an airfield at Dakar, Senegal; an airfield in Gabon;
and airfields and port facilities in Morocco and Tunisia (Barnes 7). The DOD has also
sought basing facilities in North Africa, in order to oversee counter terrorism
activities. Indeed, it established a base in Djibouti, Camp Lemonier in 2002 to
support anti terrorist activities in the Horn, East Africa, Yemen, and adjacent
stretches of the Indian Ocean (Klare and Volman 621).

II. Terrorism:

Before the events of 9/11, the U.S. government gave little attention to security
issues in Africa. By 1995, the Department of Defense asserted that American security
and economic interests in Africa were limited. However, this situation had changed
mainly after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington when U.S. recognized
Africa’s strategic importance. As it is mentioned before that this continent is very rich
of natural resources, mainly oil which the Bush administration defined as of “strategic
national interest”. Thus, it sought to secure this vital source by all the means and the only suitable option was to use the’ Global War on Terror’ as a justification to intervene military in Africa. For this reason, the Sahelian-Sahara was the stage on which it will perform its game by considering it a “zone of terror.” Here Washington faced a problem to launch its war since most of the continent; especially sub-Saharan had never witnessed terrorist activities or suffered its atrocities. The main terrorist incidents had been concentrated in Somalia, East Africa and the Maghreb, far from the oil rich of West Africa surrounding the Gulf of Guinea. Although this lack of concrete reasons of terrorist activities, the U.S. insisted to turn this region into a zone of terror and define it as a “soft underbelly for global terrorism”.

1. Fabricating a New Front of Terror:

Al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11 had created a state of emergency in the White House in terms of U.S. national security. Washington now saw threats coming from all over the world; as a result, it announced a Global War on Terror with its first theatre in Afghanistan (the first front). Since its interests in Asia and mainly the Middle East are in danger (oil), it sought to find other alternatives to provide its energy needs. The solution then was Africa, especially the Sahelian-Sahara for its geopolitical and cultural proximity to the traditional havens of terrorist groups ((Schraeder 43). In this way, the Sahelian-Sahara became known as a “New” or “Second Front” in the war on terror.

1.1 The Hostage Taking Incident:

In March 2003, the U.S. became able to justify its military presence in the African continent when the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) under the leadership of El Para
claimed responsibility for the capture of thirty two European tourists, mostly German or German speaking, in the southern Algerian Sahara. As a result, the ‘Banana Theory’ gained credibility, and the Bush administration started to pay greater attention to terrorism in Africa and particularly the Sahelian Sahara.\(^6\)

At first responsibility for the kidnapping was alleged to Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar (Belmokhtar), an outlaw who had been driven over the border into northern Mali in the late 1990s, where he carried major cigarette-smuggling operation across the Sahara. Bel Mokhtar was known to have had links with Hassan Hattab, the leader of the GSPC. Later on, it appeared that he had no relation with the kidnapping; consequently, the name of Abderrezak Lamari (El Para), another GSPC emir was declared responsible for the kidnapping (Keenan 272).

The hostages were divided in two groups in the mountains of Tamelrik and Immadir, two of the many ranges that comprise the Tassili-n-Ajjer and Ahaggar regions of southern Algeria. Three months after the kidnapping, one of the groups was liberated by an Algerian army assault. The other group composed of fourteen members was taken to northern Mali (one had died en route). They were finally released in August, after six months in captivity, following an alleged ransom payment of 5 million Euros (145).

Concerning El Para, there are many 'truths' about this vague personality. According to Washington, El Para was second-in-command or, as stated by Algeria's intelligence services, even leader of the GSPC. He was al-Qaeda's representative - bin Laden's man - in the Sahel charged with establishing al-Qaeda bases throughout the region known at least a dozen aliases. He was high on Washington's list of the world's
most-wanted terrorists, being declared an 'Specially Designated Global Terrorist', a classification shared by bin Laden and his senior commanders (Keenan 145).

Here, the research concluded that the “War on Terror” across the Sahara is associated with the hostage taking and its aftermath through 2003-2005. As a result, the entire Central Saharan region of southern Algeria, northern Mali and northern Niger became a military zone that included the military forces of the mentioned countries and the U.S. became able to put its feet in Africa under the excuse of fighting terrorism. This is how the U.S. formulated the “Second Front” of the global war on terror in a space of few months. Nevertheless, what was suspicious here was that before the hostage taking in March 2003, no act of terror, in the conventional meaning of the term, had occurred in this region (22). Yet, by the following year, the U.S. turned the region into a terrorist zone by claiming that the Sahara-Sahel was the refuge of those terrorists who escaped from the Middle East and Afghanistan. In short the hostage-taking incident was used to justify the launching of this New Front in the War on Terror by the U.S. military intelligence services.

1.2. Who Was Behind the Hostage-Taking?

There were suspicions from the beginning as to who was behind the hostage taking. An increasing amount of evidence revealed that the hostage-taking was not in fact the work of the GSPC, but was fabricated by U.S. military intelligence services. To begin with, a group of proofs was detailed in an article entitled” Security and Insecurity in North Africa” (2006) by Jeremy H. Kennan, a professor of social anthropology. The article analyzed a number of facts through which Kennan reached a conclusion asserting that the hostage taking incident was a mere fabrication by the United States. According to Keenan, El Para’s campaign was untimely; i.e.: terrorism
in Algeria had been on the decline since about 1998 and the Algerian military appeared to be controlling the situation, having effectively eliminated the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA). Second, Keenan argued that after Bouteflika’s election as president, Algeria witnessed a state of political stability and security and this state spread to the other parts of North Africa, especially the Sahelian-Sahara. In addition, he pointed out that the Sahara and Sahel had been effectively 'terrorist-free' zones, being politically, socially and geographically unsuited to such terrorism. What was striking in his claims was his argument that El Para was not ‘bin Laden’s man in the Sahara as was claimed by the White House but an agent of Algeria’s counter-terrorist organization, the Direction des Renseignements et de la Sécurité (DRS). In this sense, he wanted to say that Algeria had participated in this plan and this is not true for a number of reasons that will be discussed later. Therefore, launching the Sahara-Sahel as a “New Front” was something unbelievable mainly to the people of the region.

In addition to that, Keenan and Mustapha Barth added that there are other strong evidences that support the claim that the hostage taking was a mere American fabrication and a well-constructed story. Concerning El Para’s men engagement with the Algerian and the Malian forces, he pointed that it was not accurate according to the inhabitants of the region and El Para was not chased in a combined military operation across the Sahel. For the battle in Chad, where El Para was supposedly chased, leaders of the rebel MDJT said it never occurred. Based on these findings, hostage taking and GSPC activity across the Sahel was not in fact the work of the GSPC, but was orchestrated by U.S. military intelligence services. We conclude that launching the Sahara-Sahel as a “Second Front” was a deception, a mixture of bad intelligence, imagination and disinformation.
In addition to that, Keenan and Barth gave a number of arguments to ‘accuse’ Algeria of helping the U.S. in accomplishing its plan. For example, they argued that the Algerian army became increasingly under-equipped during the black decade of 1990’s. The western countries were reluctant to sell military equipment to Algeria fearing from Islamic reprisal and human rights criticism. The solution then for Algeria was to seek arms from the U.S. and the hostage taking was an excellent opportunity for Algeria to seek the sophisticated military weapons, they stated. Moreover, they pointed out that the incident was a proof that terrorism was not typically Algerian but it was an international phenomenon that reached even the tranquil Sahara-Sahel. Finally, they argued that Algeria will benefit from its close relations with the U.S. i.e.: the U.S. will helped it to return back its reputation and position in the world, especially in relation to NATO, the EU and the rest of the African continent (276). In sum, Keenan and Barth implied that Algeria helped the U.S. to create terrorism in the Sahara Sahel in order to serve its own interests which were the requirement of sophisticated weapons and regaining its international reputation.

What Keenan and Barth claimed about Algeria’s duplicity with the United States in its fabrication of Sahelian Sahara as a ‘breeding ground of terrorists,” however, could not be accepted or even believed for the following reasons: First, Algeria’s struggle against terrorism during the ‘black decade’ was the strongest evidence that proves that Algeria was far from being a backer of terrorism. Indeed, it sacrificed and suffered its atrocities throughout long decades. Second, Algeria has always sought the stability and security of its neighboring countries and it is inconceivable that it would contribute to disturbing the region since its stability is increasingly related to the stability of this region. In addition, Algeria has always
distanced itself from intervening or involving itself in the affairs of its neighboring countries. Third, Keenan and Barth argued that Algeria cooperate with the U.S. for the sake of acquiring sophisticated weapons. This, however, lacked concrete evidence in the sense that Algeria at that time was in the wane of its struggle against terrorism and was in no need of such weapons and it proved that it was able to overcome its terrorism problem without the help of the U.S. or other countries. Concerning the claims that Algeria wanted to regain its international reputation, we say that Algeria has always had key position in international affairs and this was enhanced with the election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as president in 1999. President Bouteflika is a skillful diplomat; he played a prominent role in giving Algeria its deserved position in the world. In addition, the events of 9/11 played a key role in enhancing Algerian credibility in the world and it became the world’s example in the fight against terrorism. Finally, Keenan argued that the release of the second group of the hostages required the paying of 5 million Euros ransom and this was not the way Algeria dealt with terrorism. For these reasons and others, Algeria could not be accused of helping the U.S. in launching the ‘second front’ in the war on terror. Algeria has always called the international community to cooperate in order to fight this phenomenon. So, it is a mistake to believe that Algeria helped creating terrorism in the Sahelian Sahara.

To conclude, the hostage taking was not the first incident that the U.S. fabricated to reach its aims. The U.S used to invent ‘false flag’ incidents in order to justify its military intervention. For example, this happened in 1962 with Operation Northwoods when it called the CIA to commit terrorist acts against innocent civilians in U.S. cities. The aim was to create the appearance of a Communist Cuban terror campaign in U.S. cities to justify its invasion of Cuba. Another example is its war in Iraq where it invented excuse of WMDs to justify its intervention there.
2. Understanding U.S. Duplicity: the Banana Theory

The launch in 2002-3 of America's new front in the 'War on Terror' across the Sahelian countries of Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad was designed primarily to create the ideological climate for Washington's militarization of Africa and securing U.S. strategic national resources, notably oil. The U.S. used the” banana theory” of global terrorism to legitimate its invasion of Africa. This theory asserted that the Sahel is “the breeding ground” through which terrorists dislodged from Central Asia and the Middle East were taking into Africa and across the Sahelian countries of Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania to link up with Islamist militants in the Maghreb (274). As EUCOM's Maj. Gen. Jeff Kohler said:

As terrorist cells were uprooted from Afghanistan and elsewhere,...
they shifted to ... the wide-open, relatively desolate areas of Africa,...
an easy back door into Europe through Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

The U.S. notion of ‘banana theory’ was a mere imagination that Washington initiated to intervene military in Africa. It, however, looses concrete evidence since the Sahel had never witnessed terrorist activities except those of smuggling. Therefore, the hostage taking was the magical stick through which the Bush administration legitimized its banana worldview of terrorism and the globalization of its war on terror. Moreover, El Para provided the missing link, he was the living proof that al-Qaeda had not only spread across the Sahel, as the Americans believed, but now spanned the Sahara. In this regard, Washington could now take its 'War on Terror' into Africa. So, al-Qaeda terrorists in the Sahara gave U.S.-EUCOM's commander, General James Jones, all the legitimacy of acquiring ‘basing rights’ and establishing what he referred to as a 'family of bases' across the continent (453).
3. The Effect of the ‘second front’ Deception on the Sahara Sahel:

The Second Front deception has done immense damage to the people of the Sahara-Saharan region. The launch of a Sahara Front in the War on Terror has created anger, frustration, rebellion, political instability and insecurity across the entire region. People of the Sahara know that there has been no real terrorism but it was a fabricated story constructed by the U.S. This generated anti-Americanism (279). The instability that resulted had done immense damage to local economies. In the Sahara Sahel, it has destroyed the region’s tourism industry and the livelihoods of families across the entire region and this led to look for other sources to live, thus smuggling and trafficking was the easiest option (490).

In sum, the “Second Front” has profound impacts and implications for the region’s political stability and security. In U.S. account, this alleged front had brought stability and democracy but in fact, it transferred the region into a dangerous zone and its people into terrorists. In addition, scholars argued that the governments of the region were the tool through which the U.S. legitimized its War on Terror. Therefore, it can be said that the Bush Administration fabricated this new front in GWOT to help creating the ideological conditions for U.S. militarization of Africa (militarization of the region through establishing military bases).

III. U.S. Militarization of Africa:

1. America's Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI):

The hostage taking was the excellent opportunity for the U.S.-EUCOM commanders to intervene military in the Sahelian Sahara. They based their intervention on the belief that the dislodged terrorists from Afghanistan and Pakistan took the region as another base through which they could launch their operations, as
EUCOM’s deputy commander General Wald described the Sahara as a ‘swamp of terror’, a ‘terrorist infestation’ which ‘we need to drain. Therefore, the U.S. interest was translated in the form of militarization where it sent its own troops to the region; it is the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). It is a $100 million 'anti-terror' initiative by President Bush for the Saharan nations of Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Niger. It was principally a military assistance and training program that did little to engage other issues of counterterrorism, including information and intelligence collection, economic development, and the development of a more diverse civil society (Laremont 261). The State Department explained the PSI as:

… a program designed to protect borders, track movement of people, combat terrorism, and enhance regional cooperation and stability. It is a State-led effort to assist Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania in detecting and responding to suspicious movement of people and goods across and within their borders through training, equipment and cooperation. Its goals support two U.S. national security interests in Africa: waging the war on terrorism and enhancing regional peace and security (Keenan 17).

The U.S. military was able to train and equip four rapid reaction companies (about 150 soldiers each) in Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Chad. These four rapid-reaction companies were created to enhance their capabilities to control their own borders, deter arms smuggling, interdict narcotics, and terrorists. The PSI rolled into action on January with the disembarkation in Nouakchott of an 'anti terror team' of 500 U.S. troops and the deployment of 400 U.S. Rangers into the Chad-Niger border region (Larémont 256).
Therefore, the U.S. launched another counter terrorism program called the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (it emerged from the PSI) in 2005. It was designed of five years, five hundred million dollar endeavor involving nine countries in North and West Africa: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad. The U.S. outlined the following objectives to help those countries in eradicating terrorism. One of its objectives is to improve the capabilities of the governments of Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, and Nigeria while enhancing cooperation between these countries with the North African states of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The second objective is to provide those countries with the appropriate tools to defeat terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and cooperation among the region’s military forces, promoting democratic governance, and reinforcing military ties with the United States. Thus, the TSCTP has military, diplomatic, and development goals (263).

Within the military domain, the principal U.S. military counterterrorism program in the Sahel is Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). This program provides counterterrorism training such the planning of military operations, communications. In addition, it provides military equipment such as vehicles, radios to the countries involved. OEF-TS has been enlarged to include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Senegal.

Within the domain of development, the principal U.S. agency involved is the United States Agency for International Development (U.S.AID). Although it should provide developmental assistance to all of the involved countries in TSCTP where AQIM is operating (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger), the only active U.S.
developmental assistance program is in Mali. Within the United State’s development plans in the region, Algeria choose not to receive U.S. developmental assistance. The U.S.AID program in Niger had been closed during October 2009 when the president of Niger was deposed in a military coup.

2. New Regional Military Command for Africa: AFRICOM.

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) was authorized by the President Bush on February 2006 with General William Ward as its commander. In 2008, AFRICOM is announced as a new and independent command for Africa with its headquarter in Stuttgart, Germany. Throughout the Cold War and for more than a decade afterwards, the U.S. did not have a military command for Africa. Instead, U.S. military activities on the African continent were conducted by three separate military commands: the European Command, which had responsibility for most of the continent; the Central Command, which oversaw Egypt and the Horn of Africa region along with the Middle East and Central Asia; and the Pacific Command, which administered military ties with Madagascar and other islands in the Indian Ocean (Volman 737). This creation of a separate military command for Africa reflected the growing importance of the continent in Washington’s political agenda (oil and GWOT). According to the Bush administration, this new command would work to provide military assistance, to endorse peace and security, and promote democracy and development to the people of Africa, of course through cooperation with the African countries:

U.S. Africa Command will better enable the Department of Defense and other elements of the U.S. government to work in concert and with partners to achieve a more stable environment in which political and
economic growth can take place [...] Unlike traditional Unified
Commands, Africa Command will focus on war prevention rather than
war-fighting. Africa Command intends to work with African nations
and African organizations to build regional security and crisis-response
capacity in support of U.S. government efforts in Africa (Keenan 18)

To achieve greater integration of military policies, AFRICOM is composed of
both military and civilian personnel, including officers from the State Department and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S.AID), and the commander of the
new command will have both a military and a civilian deputy. The civilian deputy the
command’s plans and programs for health, humanitarian assistance, de-mining action,
disaster response, security sector reform, Peace Support Operations (Wiley 19). The
reason that lies behind this structure is to insure that the main purpose of AFRICOM
is the promotion of peace and security and not creating internal and regional conflicts.

However, this is not the main purpose. When creating AFRICOM, the Bush
administration outlined two main objectives, the first being securing access to the
continent’s energy sources and the second being defeating China’s threat. Concerning
the first objective, Washington argued that through expanding military operations and
security assistance programs to the African countries (mainly oil and gas producers) it
could secure its future energy demands. Concerning China, U.S. policymakers
became more alarmed about the China’s involvement in the continent to secure its
interests (energy supplies). Washington considers this as a threat to its national
security; as a result, the creation of AFRICOM will be the weapon that the U.S. will
use to restrain China’s economic engagement in the continent (Volman 739).
3. AFRICOM Programs:

The United States Africa Command includes military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs. The United States Africa Command includes military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs. The U.S. States provides military training to African military personnel and conducts military exercises in Africa jointly with African troops and with the troops of its European allies to provide training to others and to train its own forces for possible deployment to Africa in the future. These include Flintlock 2005 and 2007. Those programs include Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance Program (ACOTA), International Military Education and Training Program (IMET).

Moreover, the U.S. provided military assistance through the following programs. First, the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS) through which US military equipment are sold to African countries through loans provided by the US government. Sales are conducted by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency of the Defense Department. Second, the African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBS) which provides specialized equipment (such as patrol vessels and, communications equipment, night vision devices) to African countries to improve their ability to patrol and defend their own coastal waters and borders from terrorist operations, smuggling. Third, the Excess Defense Articles Program (EDA); through this program, the US transfers its surplus of military equipment.

Finally, the U.S. sought to establish its presence on the continent through the followings: The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) which is based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and works with a multinational naval force. It conducts naval operations in the Horn of Africa. Another program is the Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (JTFAS) that is charged with conducting surveillance operations
and sharing information, along with intelligence collected by U.S. intelligence agencies, with African military forces. Another program is AFRICOM which has the task of coordinating naval operations along the African coastline. Finally, the Base Access Agreements for Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Operating Sites through which the United States gains access to local military bases and other facilities so that they can be used by American forces (743).

4. The Impact of AFRICOM on the People of Africa:

As usual under the umbrella of keeping peace, promoting democracy, and fighting terrorism, the U.S. justified its military presence and intervention. In Africa, it argued that the African states are weak and lacked the mechanisms through which they could establish well-unified, stable, and developed states. So, those problems helped to legitimize its military presence in the continent to overcome those obstacles. The result, however, was catastrophic: internal conflicts, political unrest. Indeed, the establishment of AFRICOM has generated the same consequences for the people of Africa. African countries are becoming heavily militarized and this led them to use force to realize their own objectives. With U.S. military support, they repressed political opposition, which resulted in creating insecurity and unrest (19). In this context, U.S. AFRICOM encouraged devastation, unrest, instability instead of promoting peace and security.

Conclusion:

American interests in Africa are all linked together. In order to secure its access to African oil, it used the second front on the war on terror as justification to militarize Africa and in this way it can make sure that its interests are protected.
Through the writing of the first chapter I revealed that the U.S. wherever it has interests, it seeks to secure them by all the means. It announced publically that its military involvement aimed at enhancing peace and security and promoting democracy but always the opposite happened, political instability, unrest….This is what happened in Africa when it sought to secure its energy supplies, it fabricated a terror zone in the Sahara Sahel through which it can legitimize its militarization of Africa.
CHAPTER TWO:

THE MALIAN CRISIS

Introduction:

The West African country of Mali has mired in overlapping security, political, and humanitarian crisis that threatens its territorial integrity and therefore its sovereignty. The country's political leadership has been uncertain since a military coup on March 2012 that overthrew a democratically elected government in the capital Bamako. The coup was precipitated by the MNLA (National Movement of Liberation of Al Azwad) demand for an independent state of the Azwad in northern Mali and Ansar Eddin, and MUJAO domination of the region.

The second chapter will deal with the Malian crisis and focuses mainly on the situation in the northern Mali. To do so, it is necessary to begin with the giving a general background about the region i.e. its geography and sociology because they are considered important to understand the roots of the crisis. Then, it moves to identify the security threats which contribute to destabilize the region’s security. Those threats, trafficking, Islamic terrorism and Tuareg rebellion are the result of several reasons. Thus, the chapter examines the attempts made by the government in order to limit or at least reduce those threats. As the development goes deeper, it also analyses the impact of those threats on the local communities and their attempts to eliminate those threats. Finally, the chapter tackles the focal point which is the Tuareg rebellion and their demand of independence.
I. Geography and Sociology of Northern Mali:

The north of Mali is a large area situated in the Sahel region. It stretches over 922,490 km² within an area covering 1,241,238 km², which represents 74.32 percent of the Malian territory. Mali shares a 5,000 km long border with Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso. Northern Mali is made up of three regions, Timbuktu (681,691 inhabitants), Gao (544,120 inhabitants) and Kidal (67,638 inhabitants). The north of Mali belongs to the Sahara, with weak and irregular rainfall (below 200 mm per year) and extremely difficult living conditions. The physical landscape is dominated by sand and rocks such as the Adrar des Iforas or Ifoghas, situated to the south-west of the Hoggar Mountains in the northeast of the region. The activities practiced in this region are mainly raising camels and cattle, trans-sahara trade, and agriculture. (Sidibe 19)

From a sociological point of view, Malian communities living in the north of the country are nomadic: Tuareg (1.7 per cent of the national population); Arabs, including Moors and Kountas (1.2 per cent of the national population); Peuls, nomadic pastoralists (data unavailable); and the Sonrhaïs or Songhoys, who live in fixed settlements (7.2 per cent). The Sonrhaïs are the largest community in the Timbuktu and Gao regions, followed by the Tuareg, also called ‘blue people’ due to the color of their clothing, who are predominant in and around Timbuktu. Arabs are mainly found in Timbuktu, Bourême and Kidal. The Kountas inhabit the Telemi valley, between Gao and Kidal. The nomadic Peuls are distributed around these three regions. The Tuareg, Arabs/Moors and Peuls share relatively similar physical appearances and differ from the features of Songhaï (black African) populations. The
social organization of these three communities is also very similar (highly hierarchical, caste-based, where authority is based on Islamic law) (Sidibe 74).

The relations between these four communities are conflictual, frequent clashes between nomadic populations (Arabs/Tuareg, /Peuls) on the one hand, and with farming populations on the other. Before colonization, the main reason of conflict was the complexes of superiority and inferiority. White populations ((Tuareg and Arabs) saw themselves as superior to their black counterparts (farming communities). This often led to a deadly clashes since the black populations saw themselves as legitimate owners of the land, took up arms against Tuareg and Arab communities (the third Tuareg rebellion 1995). After colonization, the rivalry was about controlling the trans-Saharan trade, drug trafficking, and cattle theft. For example, powerful Tuareg tribes such as the Ifoghas wage war against Arab groups to control the trans-Saharan trade. Frequent rivalries are also noted between Rguibat Arabs and Kounta Arabs because of drug trafficking: Arab groups of Tilemsi kidnapped a Kounta chief, Baba Ould Sidi El Moctar, at Anefis in the Kidal region in January 2010, mainly in response to the capture of one of their drug cargos by the Ifoghas and the Kountas. He was subsequently released thanks to the intervention of Mali’s president, Amadou Toumani Touré. Tensions between Tuareg and Peuls, relating to cattle theft and grazing land, have led to several assassinations. This, however, does not mean that there is no intercommunity alliances between them, marriages are promoted between the different groups especially between the Tuareg and Arabs (Sidibe 74).
1. **Security Threats:**

The Sahel now has become increasingly identified as a refuge to criminal networks (trafficking arms, drugs...) and terrorist groups searching for alternative bases from which they can launch and finance their activities. They have benefited from the geography of the region (a vast desert) and the lack of state presence in those regions. Those who live in North Mali are also involved in those activities. By doing this, they contribute in disturbing the stability of their region.

2. **Trafficking: Arms, Drugs, Cigarettes, and Vehicles**

There are several routes through which arms move from one region to another. The main routes are Kidal-Tin-Essako axis and the Tamassina valley-Tedjerert border with Algeria and Niger; in the Timbuktu region arms are supplied through the Timbuktu border with Mauritania. Arms with its different types are circulating in the region, Kalashnikovs, M16, and Beretta AR-70s. Small arms are also found in North Mali and nearly every inhabitant owns a small arm, because they are cheap in the region.

Inhabitants of the North are also engaged in drug trafficking, for example there is a district in Gao called the “cocaine district” because most of its inhabitants are drug dealers. Tribal groups played a key role in the development of drug trafficking since they are nomads they have a good knowledge about the desert. They are used by the traffickers as drivers or guides because the traffickers live in the capital Bamako. Concerning the organization of the drug movement it is noted that Northern Mali is the intermediate between Latin America and Europe i.e. the merchandise comes from Latin America to Northern Mali (Tassilit in Kidal and Boureme in Gao) and then from Northern Mali to Europe. Members of the Kounta
Arab communities, who control most trans-Saharan trade, are considered the main actors in the drug trade. In addition, Sidibé mentioned other transnational actors such as Mauritanians, elements of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Moroccans (Sidibé 76).11

Moreover, cigarettes and vehicles are among the goods that circulate illegally in the region. Brands such as Marlboro, Gauloise are cheap; they are sold at half the market price. The main receptive cities are Bamako, Sikasso, Ségou, Kayes. Vehicles coming from Europe entered the region via Mauritania’s capital Nouakchott. The Nouakchott- Nema-Timbuktu-Kidal route is the most used by mafia networks.

3. **Terrorism:**

The main active terrorist group in the region is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the new name of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) that was active in Algeria in the 1990’s. AQIM joined Al Qaeda Central (AQC) in 2007 and it provided it with fighters and jihadists. The AQIM involved other Islamic groups from Mauritania, Niger, and Mali. Here it sought to create a safe haven among the Tuareg tribes of Mali, Niger and Mauritania where it can obtain refuge and encourage Tuareg rebellion against central states. Within the Sahel, AQIM has been able to conduct its operations effectively benefiting from the geography of the region and the lack of state presence. AQIM established its southern theatre of operation in northern Mali (the northern theater extends from east of Algiers and continues eastward toward Tunisia), in the Kidal region and from that base it can control southern Algeria, southern Libya, southeastern Mauritania, northern and eastern Mali, and northern and western Niger. In addition, it includes Tuareg, Arab,
Moors because of their good knowledge of the desert. This is to say that AQIM have become increasingly present in northern Mali (Bulletin).

AQIM has the same tactics of Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In other words, it has found remote regions, principally in Mali and secondarily in Algeria, Mauritania and Niger, where it can operate freely without governmental surveillance or interference. In addition to that, AQIM depends on two sources for revenue which are trade in counter band and ransom paid for hostages to raise income for terrorist activity. They use various forms of trafficking (mainly drug) to acquire vehicles, weapons, and effective means of communication. For example, AQIM levy a tax on merchandise destined for Western countries. Kidnapping and ransom of Europeans nationals have also become an important source of revenue (Laremont 253).

4. The Tuareg Rebellion:

The north of Mali comprises a broad area of the Sahara that borders Mauritania, Algeria, Niger and Burkina Faso. The Tuareg nomads, groups of Moors and Bella, inhabit this region (as well as parts of Libya) and move across national boundaries in their travels. When drawing boundaries, the colonial powers sought to distribute the Tuareg population on several countries, and made them citizens of different nationalities. Shortly after the independence of Mali, Tuareg battle for independence began; it started in 1962 and continued until 1990’s. The different waves of Tuareg rebellion emerged because of state repression and the marginalization of Tuareg and Arab nomadic communities living in the north of Mali. Successive Malian regimes responded with the rebellions in different ways: between 1962 and 1964, the government of Modibo Keita militarily suppressed the rebellion.
In 1990, the first attempt to settle peace in the region was the “Tamanrasset Accords” negotiated by President Moussa Traore and two rebel movement, MPA (Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad) and FIAA (Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad) in Algeria on 6 January 1991. In general, the rebels demanded decentralization i.e. establishing local and regional councils made up of local representatives and allocating 47.3 percent of the national budget to northern Mali. However, the Tamanrasset Accords did not solve the problem completely because not all the rebel groups signed the Accords, and tensions persisted (Seely 506). Traore then refused to negotiate with the rebels.

However, the authorities which presided over the democratic transition of 1991 chose to recognize rebel movement. The new military leaders established a transition committee, the Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple (CTSP), headed by General Amadou Toumani Touré in order to find a political solution to the issue. This initiative was followed by the signing of the “National Pact” in April 1992 by the transitional Malian government and several Tuareg factions. It calls for the integration of Tuareg combatants into the Malian armed forces, demilitarization of the north, economic integration of northern populations, and administrative structure for the three northern regions (decentralization). President Konaré himself made a visit to northern Mali to show to Tuareg that his government has the will to solve the issue and integrate them with the Malian community (508).

Despite those efforts to contain the Tuareg threat if we can say, the Tuareg still assist to be recognized by their government and to be treated as those of the south. This is what happened in 2006 in Kidal where Tuareg belonging to the Democratic Alliance for Change attacked units of the national army in Kidal and Ménaka. They then declared a new rebellion against the government of Mali, which they accused of
breaching the terms of the National Pact (78). This recurrence of the crisis can be explained by the persistent lack of development in the region, as well as weak state presence, especially in Kidal. Further, the Tuareg issue has always been exploited by neighboring countries, such Libya under Qadafi who publically announced his support of the Tuareg.

Libya under Colonel Qadafi always regarded itself as the protector and the defender of the Tuareg cause by claiming that Libya had been their original home before they spread out into Algeria, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. EL Qaddafi declared that he would establish ‘the Greater Saharan’ state in which he envisaged a federation that would include the Tuareg of Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Algeria. In addition, it is argued that elements of the 1990s rebellion were former fighters from the Libyan Islamic legion. This created a state of fear that the Tuareg rebellion will be renewed mainly after what happened in Libya (the turmoil of 2011).

There is a well established relation between those security threats (criminal networks, terrorism, Tuareg rebellion) in the sense that every component benefited from the actions of the other one. For instance, criminal networks benefited from the violent actions committed by the terrorist groups and rebel groups, while the latter benefited from the money derived from the criminal activities. AQIM terrorist groups use drug traffickers to obtain weapons, ammunition, 4x4 vehicles and communication tools which they needed in their activities. AQIM from its part hand over the money received from ransoms to drugs traffickers who use it in their own activities.
II. Malian Strategies against Security Threats:

The presence of criminal networks and terrorist groups in northern Mali pose a threat to Mali’s security and territorial integrity. This led the Malian authorities to take several measures to put an end to those threats or at least reduce their negative results. Those initiatives include administrative, military, and legislative instruments.

1. Territorial Administrative Division:

The government of Konare decided to decentralize the power i.e. to devolve the power to local units and decision making involves the local population (Mawhood quote in Seely). This program was mainly directed to the people of the north in order to contain the Tuareg separatists. Therefore, the northern regions (Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao) are divided into administrative areas, districts, villages and fractions. Administrative areas are governed by prefects and urban districts by sub-prefects. Decentralized entities are governed by regional assemblies, area councils and district councils. District councilors are chosen through universal direct suffrage, and area and regional councilors through indirect suffrage. Leaders of fractions, villages, and urban districts work with local authorities (49)

2. The Deployment of Armed Forces in the North of Mali:

The government of Mali also deployed armed forces in the region to further enhance security and stability. However, their number was insignificant compared to the region’s vast area and problems. The distribution of military forces in the north is as follows:
**Armed Forces**: the size of the army is estimated at 2,000 soldiers for the Gao region (Gao and Ménaka), 1,500 for the Kidal region (Kidal and Tessalit) and 1,700 for the Timbuktu region (Timbuktu and Goundam).

**National Guard**: is a branch of the army attempts to enhance security in the northern regions. It consists of specialized Meharist unit, which carries out operations on camel-back. The reason behind the creation of Meharist units was to cope with the lack of resources needed to control the vast desert areas. They were incorporated into the National Guard in 1995. The National Guard has 400 soldiers in the Gao region, 350 in the Kidal region, and 450 in the Timbuktu region (security checkpoints at Foita, Ras el Ma and Naker, Tamalet).

**National Gendarmerie**: Have 275 officers in the Gao region, 150 in the Kidal region, and 250 in the Timbuktu region.

**National Police**: there are 79 officers in the Gao region, 46 in the Kidal region, and 27 in Timbuktu. Legislative instruments:

The Malian government initiates several laws in order to limit criminal networks and terrorism. Among those laws; the Malian law n°08-025 of 23 July 2008, which aimed at putting an end to terrorism, criminalizes acts .This law is in line with the United Nations’ global anti-terrorism strategy. Moreover, the government has introduced an integrated program to fight all forms of organized crime. This programme has established new anti-crime structures known as *Pôles économiques* and *Office National de Répression du Trafic de Drogue et de Stupéfiants*. Bilateral donors such as Denmark, Luxembourg, Austria and Italy, through the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Sidibé), also support it.
Concerning the fight against terrorism, Mali sought the help of the neighboring countries. However, there are differences in the strategies followed by each nation toward the issue and mainly that of ransom. For example, Algeria rejects any ransom payment to secure the release of hostages.\textsuperscript{13} Mauritania and Niger hold the same strategy. In contrast to Mali that preferred negotiation with the terrorists. Following this strategy Mali was increasingly criticized by its neighbors may because when it did that it encouraged terrorism. So, to prevent such criticism and being accused of supporting terrorist, Mali joint its partners and they established a joint operational committee (Comité d’Etat Major Opérationnel Conjoint-CEOG. The aim of this committee is to coordinate combined anti-terrorist military operations (15).

3. Development Policy for Northern Mali:

In addition to the strategies mentioned above, Mali’s government planned a developmental policy in the North which aimed at raising awareness among the local communities, support them to provide their basic needs, strengthen small arms return and fight against arms proliferation. To achieve those goals, the government initiated two locally- integrated programs to enhance security and fight against terrorism. The first is the Emergency Program for Security and Anti-Terrorism in the North of Mali (Programme d’Urgence pour la Réduction de l’Insécurité et la Lutte Contre le Terrorisme dans le Nord-Mali – PIRIN, 2010–2012) and the second is the Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in the North (Programme Spécial pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement dans le Nord – PSPSDN, 2010).

The PIRIN’s main objective is to eliminate or at least reduce the causes of insecurity in the North. To do that, the establishment of new security outposts such gendarmerie and police stations are necessary to the securitization of the North. In
addition, the construction of health centers, schools, administrative offices are among the tools that may participate to establish security in the region. In addition, the program emphasized the development of the penal system, communication and demilitarization through the return of small arms. While the PIRIN is more interested in securitization, the PSPSDN is interested in issues related to the local communities. It aims at ensuring the presence of state authorities, fight against the proliferation of small arms, illegal drugs trafficking, and organized crime. Coordinate, and evaluate the insecurity and anti-terrorism strategy (57).

4. Local communities and security threats:

Local communities in Northern Mali are greatly affected by recurrent security threats. Tourism, the local crafts industry and cattle rearing are the main targets. Due to this instability those activities are suffering, Investments in the tourism sector have decreased artisans are struggling to pay their employees, taxes and loans as their most products are sold to tourists. Cattle rearing also suffer and this led many to escape to the south and others (including Tuareg) engage in illegal activities. In addition, the increasing circulation of weapons forced others to move to the cities where they can survive at least in less threatened environment. Another significant impact is that those security threats (terrorism and trafficking) create a state of tension between communities in the north and mainly between Tuareg and Arabs since both have engagements in criminal activities. The most dangerous impact is the exploitation that the local communities by the terrorists and the criminal groups. For example, many young people are used as drivers, informants, guiders while others join the AQIM or other religious fundamentalist groups in return of money as Sidibé pointed out (78).
To eradicate these negative impacts, local communities are intervened to solve those security threats. For instance, intercommunity meetings are held in order to raise awareness among people and the leaders (of the community) play a key role in influencing people’s opinion. They use the values of Islam (since they are Muslims) to preach, to convince people about the importance of working together to establish peace and security. Religious leaders are also involved in resolving intercommunity conflicts such as between the Arabs and Kountas in the Gao region.

To enhance further the attempts of the Malian government in defeating those security threats, various networks are engaged to help to implement government policies. For instance, an intercommunity meeting on peace and security in Northern Mali organized in Kidal in October 2009. It included participants from the three northern regions and Bamako in addition to international participants such as Algeria and Libya. This meeting ended with the establishment of the Northern Mali Network for Peace and Security, supported by the European Union (85).

Although those attempts to restore peace and security in Northern Mali, the situation still remains threatening to the stability and territorial integrity of Mali. The government has tried to reconsider the north and integrate its population with that of the south through several initiatives such as, deploying armed forces in the region, eradicating criminal networks…. In addition, it seeks the support of the local communities, the chiefs and the religious to help in solving the issue since they have the power to influence and convince people about the necessity of the stability of their region. This, however, seems not enough and do not satisfy the demands of those in the north. They claim that they are still marginalized, ill treated by their government which led them to ask for independence and create an independent
Tuareg state in the north of the country. External factors help a key role in intensifying the situation, the turmoil in Libya was the golden opportunity for the armed groups to launch their rebellion since they are now well equipped and well supported by the return of El Qaddafi loyalists (Tuareg who fought with El Qaddafi). The rebellion has been launched on 17 January by the National Liberation Movement of the Azwad (MNLA). The rebellion adds more worse to the security of Mali in particular and its neighboring countries in general.

5. The Tuareg Rebellion and the Demand of an Independent State of the Azwad in Northern Mali:

After the defeat of El-Qaddafi, the Tuareg fighters who served in the Libyan army returned to their regions in northern Mali well equipped with weapons that had been used later in the Tuareg rebellion. The rebellion was launched by the National Liberation Movement of the Azwad (MNLA) in January 2012 and aimed at establishing an independent state in northern Mali. The MNLA benefited from the coup d’état of March 2012 and the support of Ansar Eddin (defenders of faith) to take control of the northern regions of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu. By taking Timbuktu the MNLA was now able to declare its independence from Bamako. As a result, on 6 April the independent state of the Azwad was declared. Although the MNLA claimed that it represented all the people of the Azwad, its declaration was not accepted by the FNLA (Arab Front for the Liberation of Azwad) which opposed the Tuareg domination of Timbuktu. In addition, the international community rejected the declaration and considered it as a threat to Mali’s territorial integrity and stability. For instance, the African Union rejected it saying that it had no legitimacy. The
neighboring countries also expressed their fears that they would be influenced by the
development in northern Mali and they would witness similar situation.

Although both the MNLA and the various Islamist groups (Ansar Dine)
cooperated with each other in the fight against the Malian government, seeds of
conflict appeared due to the ideological differences between them. The goal of the
MNLA, to establish an independent state of Azwad out of Northern Mali, contrasted
sharply with the aims of the Islamist groups, who wanted to implement Sharia law
and not the independence. As a result, the MNLA was forced to leave the city
(Bulletin). Moreover, the MNLA fighters were forced out of the city of Gao after a
bitter confrontation with the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
MUJAO). However, the MNLA stated that it continued to maintain forces and
control some rural areas in the region. We can say that the so called the independent
state of the Azwad has created more problems than it sought to resolve in the sense
that its cooperation with the Islamist groups led by the end to their total domination of
the northern Mali. In addition, it seems that Ansar Dine” and MUJAO” were waiting
for that rebellion in order to dominate northern Mali and destabilize Mali and its
neighbors. As a result of the Islamists groups’ control of the North, it becomes
necessary to deal with the situation in order not to permit those groups which have
connections with the AQIM to disturb the Malian stability and integrity and transform
it into a base through which they can launch their attacks on the neighboring
countries. The MNLA from its side claimed that it would support any initiative that
may lead to end the insecurity state in northern Mali and this can be illustrated
through its support of the French intervention.
Conclusion:

The evolving crisis in Mali is one of the most difficult, complex, and urgent problems in West Africa. Mali’s problems reflect the fragility of governance in the region, the lack of economic development – especially in northern Mali – the absence of meaningful opportunities for people to engage with their governments. The March 2012 coup has much contributed in worsening the situation and has been taken as an opportunity by other groups to realize their aims, The MNLA to establish an independent state, and the Islamic groups to find other bases from where they can operate and thereby threaten the security of the whole region.

For this reason, the international community should strive to prevent, if we can say, the “Balkanization” of Mali and help it regain control of its northern region because the instability of the region will be exploited by the “terrorists”. If they were allowed this opportunity, they will threaten not only Mali but also the other neighboring countries. This involves French intervention which caused the terrorist groups to attack Algeria and threaten its security.
CHAPTER 3

U.S. - ALGERIAN RELATIONS

Introduction

U.S. - Algerian relations date back to 1795 when the two countries signed the Treaty of Amity and Peace, a few years after the official recognition of the independence American Republic by the Regency of Algiers (1783). Then, Algeria was among the first countries that recognized the independence of the United States. Senator John F. Kennedy’s speech in support of Algeria's independence when the country was under French colonialism marks a turning point in Algerian-American relations in the contemporary era. Relations between the two countries continued to prosper after Algeria’s independence particularly when Algeria secured the freedom of 52 Americans held hostage in Iran in 1979.

The 9/11 also added more to enrich the relations between the two countries, Algeria was one of the first countries to condemn the terrorist attacks and president Bouteflika supported the U.S. in its fight against terrorism. Since then both countries cooperated with each other in the fight against terrorism. The intensity of cooperation between Algeria and the United States is illustrated by the number and frequency of high-level visits made by civilian and military officials of both countries. Relations between Algeria and the United States have entered a new, dynamic and very promising phase and are stronger than they have ever been. While characterized by close collaboration on regional and international issues of mutual interest, ties between both countries also exist in the economic sector.
Thus, this third chapter will deal with U.S.-Algerian relations and emphasizes their collaboration in the fight against terrorism. Before that, it will tackle in brief the economic ties between the two countries and highlights the hydrocarbon sector as the main interest of U.S. investment. Then it will move to discuss U.S. - Algerian relations relating to the fight against terrorism. For better clarifying their cooperation, it focuses on the Algerian role in fighting terrorism. Finally, it tackles the Malian Crisis assesses its impact on Algerian security and shows how the U.S. counterterrorism helped worsening the situation in Northern Mali.

1. Trade and Investment

The Algerian economy is largely based on the hydrocarbons sector, in the sense that it accounts for about 60% of budget revenues, nearly 30% of GDP, and over 97% of export income. Algeria has the seventh-largest reserves of natural gas in the world (2.7% of proven world total) and is the second-largest gas liquid natural gas (LNG) producer. It ranks 14th for oil reserves. Its key oil and gas customers are Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. Algeria is also an important supplier of naturally liquefied gas and petroleum products to the United States, and as such is involved in the security of America’s energy supply. U.S. companies have played a major role in developing Algeria's oil and gas sector; U.S. interests in Algeria are also reflected in the considerable investments and/or operational involvements of U.S. companies in Algeria's hydrocarbons sector. For instance, of the $4.1 billion (according to statistics gathered by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis) in U.S. investment in Algeria, the largest amount is in the petroleum sector (Volman 497).
In 2005 the volume of trade exchange reached its highest levels between the
two countries; indeed, from $3.3 billion in 2002—that volume increased to 5.2 billion
(dollars) in 2003, and 8.3 billion (dollars) in 2004 and reached almost $12 billion in
2005. Algeria is the United States' 10th-largest market in the Middle East/North
African region. U.S. exports to Algeria totaled $1.2 billion in 2005, an increase of
more than 50% since 2003. U.S. imports from Algeria grew from $4.7 billion in 2002
to $10.8 billion in 2005, primarily in oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). This means
that the United States is the first trading partner of Algeria since most of Algeria’s
dealings are with the United States (the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs).

The United States and Algeria signed a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) in July 2001. The TIFA provides for regular, high-level bilateral
consultations on trade and investment relations, and a free-trade agreement (FTA).
The two governments meet on an ongoing basis to discuss trade and investment
policies and opportunities to enhance the economic relationship. Within the
framework of the U.S.-North African Economic Partnership (U.S.NAEP), the United
States provided about $1.0 million in technical assistance to Algeria in 2003. This
program supported and encouraged Algeria's economic reform program and included
support for World Trade Organization accession negotiations, debt management, and
improving the investment climate. In 2003, U.S.NAEP programs were transformed
into Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) activities.

2. Countering Terrorism

Algeria’s warnings against terrorism and its calls for international cooperation
were ignored for a long time. It was only after the 9/11 attacks that international view
changed and Algeria’s warnings that terrorism was an international phenomenon
gained credence. Several countries became interested in the Algerian experience and the expertise the country had gained in counterterrorism operations. The United States was among the first states to acknowledge the need for international cooperation to fight terrorism, thus it declared a Global War on Terror.

U.S.—Algerian cooperation on the war on terror started shortly after September 11, 2001. Algeria was one of the first countries to condemn the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Bouteflika was one of the first Muslim leaders to offer help and support to the U.S.A in its “War on Terror.” President Bouteflika visited the United States twice in 2001, in July and November and he became the first Algerian President to visit the White House since 1985. Bouteflika on his visit to the United States has met with President George Bush and other U.S. officials to review U.S.-Algerian relations on to key issues and the main one was the fight against terrorism. In the fight against Muslim fundamentalists, Algeria seems to be the strategic partner of the United States in its War on Terror since it had a long experience in fighting terrorism. U.S. officials became aware of Algeria’s struggle during the black decade and its management in solving the crisis. As a result, Algeria has become the example that the international community should follow to overcome this threat. The Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called Algeria, “a good partner in the struggle against extremism, and a thoughtful, constructive, moderate voice in our region”. This “recognition” proved again that Algeria was the only country in the world that suffered greatly the atrocities of terrorism and was able to fight it without any support of the international community and thus it deserves to be called the “world leader” in the fight against terrorism.
In the following years, two U.S. secretaries of state (Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice), the secretary of defense (Donald Rumsfeld), two assistant secretaries of state (William Burns and David Welsh), as well as a number of senior security and military figures and members of Congress also visited Algeria. This signaled the growing importance of Algeria in U.S. political agenda in particular and the world in general (Berouk). This is what President Bouteflika sought to achieve: the recognition of Algeria’s fight of terrorism by the international community and thus legitimizes its struggle. 9/11 events then enhanced further Algerian reputation and its calls to cooperate to eliminate or at least reduce the danger of terrorism. The proof is that many countries took the Algerian example to deal with terrorism and among them the United States, which immediately after the 9/11 recognized the importance of Algeria in helping it in its war on terror. As a result, Algeria has become the key partner of the United States and it participates in a number of bilateral and multilateral efforts to fight terrorism (Berouk).

U.S.–Algeria bilateral efforts include:

- Training and equipping of security forces: Algerian security officers benefit from U.S. training and cooperation. There is less cooperation concerning equipment. For example, the United States’ arms sales to Algeria are symbolic (notably night sight equipment). U.S. military assistance is not sufficient although it increased from $121,000 in 2001 to $800,000 in 2008.
- Concerning intelligence sharing, the U.S. made several attempts to convince Algeria with the necessity of sharing and exchanging information. Algeria, however, is still reluctant. For instance, the Obama administration tell the Algerians if they allowed the U.S. to fly unarmed drones over the border area
of Algeria as well as over Mali, the American would share information with the Algerian government.

Algeria is also an active participant in multilateral efforts sponsored by the United States and the United Nations. Multilateral initiatives include:

- U.S. technical support to the African Center for Studies and Research on Terrorism (CAERT), which is hosted by Algeria. The support aims at developing a better operational African strategy against terrorism. Algeria is an active participant in the project. For example, the Center organized a seminar in Algiers (2005) to discuss the terrorist threats in the African continent and the United States was among the participants. U.S. support of the CAERT was demonstrated through the significant number of its delegates, including the coordinator for counterterrorism at the State Department, Ambassador Henry Crumpton, and other officials from the Pentagon, as well as academics.

- Operation Active Endeavor, organized under NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative and designed to fight terrorism in the region.

- Algeria participates in the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). This initiative was launched in 2004 (TSCTI) with the participation of Algeria and other countries from North Africa and the Sahel regions. As part of this initiative.

- Algeria is actively involved in all international and regional efforts at fighting this phenomenon, the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006), the effort to curb money laundering, and fighting organized crime.
These bilateral and multilateral efforts benefited both Algeria and the United States. For Algeria, they provided additional knowledge about the ways and the techniques used in eradicating the terrorist threat. They also provided the proof for the international community to legitimize Algerian struggle during the 1990’s legitimized its war on terror. For the United States, cooperation with Algeria helped improve the intelligence needed to fight terrorism worldwide (Berouk).

Although the United States provided funds to Algeria under the Middle East Partnership Initiative, they are insufficient in comparison to those funds provided to its neighboring countries (notably Morocco). Algeria is the sixth-largest supplier of oil and gas to the United States but remains a second-tier recipient of American direct investments in the region (less than $5 billion mostly in the oil industry, by 2008). For this reason, the United States must recognize Algeria’s importance in the fight against terrorism and. Since Algeria is considered key partner in counterterrorism, the United States must give more interest to Algeria rather than other countries in the sense that Algeria contributes so much in enhancing U.S. security. So, Washington must recognize of Algeria’s importance to the region. Algeria is pivotal to U.S. strategies in North Africa and the Sahel for a number of reasons:

- Geo-strategically, Algeria has a strategic location i.e it is centrally positioned in the Maghreb and has borders with Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Western Sahara, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia.

- It is among the four major producers of natural gas in the world. It is also a major supplier of energy to the United States.
• It is a fast growing economy in the Maghreb. Even in the midst of the current international financial and economic crisis, Algerian GDP is expected to grow by 3.5 percent in 2009.

• It is implementing structural political reforms in order to construct a presidential system that institutionalizes democratic governance and political pluralism.

• Its policy of national reconciliation, coupled with a successful counterterrorism strategy has brought positive results, and among those results, it strengthens the credibility of Algerian expertise as a leader in counterterrorism.

  Its diplomatic activism in creating an international consensus against terrorism and its call to differentiate between terrorism and resistance also deserves attention.

  For the war on terror in North Africa and the Sahel to succeed, the United States should assist Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania in alleviating poverty and fighting organized crime and narcotics trafficking. It should back Algerian diplomatic efforts at stabilizing Niger and Mali, which are facing rebellion by the Tuareg minorities. It should assist the African Union and its Council for Peace and Security in developing regional mechanisms of preventive diplomacy. Algeria has been at the forefront of preventive securitization by presiding over the CPS from the start (two senior Algerian diplomats, Said Djanit and now Ramtane Lamamra have held the presidency of the Council) (Berouk).
3. The impact of the Malian Crisis on the Algerian National Security

As the turmoil in Northern Mali intensified, the international community is alarmed and stressed on the need to intervene to find a quick and peaceful solution to the crisis. The ECOWAS at the beginning preferred a political solution through negotiation and then deploying armed forces if necessary. France, however, saw that the military intervention is the only option through which stability will be achieved in the north. France’s suggestion of using military force can be explained by its attempts to protect its interests in the region (energy resources in Mali and in North Africa in general). As a result, it launched its campaign in Northern Mali with the consent of the international community. This, however, was not welcomed by the Islamic groups in the north and claimed that the intervention will destroy rather than create peace. As a result, Algeria became a target of the terrorist threat and this can be illustrated through the terrorist attack on the gas plant in Tiguentourine (Bulletin) on 16 January 2013.

The attack came on the sixth day of the military intervention by an Islamist group calling itself “Signatories in Blood,” a combat unit headed by Bel Mokhtar, “the uncatchable”. Bel Mokhtar said that the raid was carried out by forty militants from the Muslim world and European countries and they did that as a reaction against all who intervened in Mali. In addition, he said that the attack at In Amenas was just the “beginning” and they could expect other attacks. However, the Algerian Prime Minister argued that the French military intervention was just an excuse and the attack was planned for at least two months. Here we may hypothesize that the assault purpose was to threaten Algeria’s stability and by this way, the terrorists may find an alternative refuge in the Algerian desert if they are defeated in Mali.
In a conference held four days after the assault, Algerian Prime Minister Sellal gave details about this terrorist attack and its consequences. Sellal provided information about the assailants who numbered around 30 coming from northern Mali and had inside intelligence and detailed plans of the gas plant. He further informed that the Algerian forces had made two assaults, one on 17 January and the second on 19 January during which the Special Forces killed the remaining attackers; a side effect was the killing of seven hostages. Concerning the exact number of the hostages being killed, Sellal said 37 foreign nationals from eight countries and one Algerian died, with five more people unaccounted for. Totals released by individual nations come to a figure of 40 dead or missing, excluding Algerians. Japan suffered the biggest confirmed death toll with 10 nationals known to have died. Other countries suffering deaths or injury to nationals are UK, Philippines, Norway, U.S., France, Romania and Malaysia. Nearly 700 Algerians and 100 foreigners survived.

To prove that the Tiguentourine terrorist attack posed a threat to Algeria’s national security or not, it is necessary to analyze some facts that may lead us at least to reveal the real impact of the Malian crisis (whether it is the attack on Tiguentourine or Algeria’s fears to face instability as Northern Mali).

To begin with, we need to return back to the first chapter in which we explain how the United States launched the alleged Sahara Sahel as a “new”, “second” front in the war on terror. Through the analysis of several facts, the research has reached the conclusion that the “second front” was a mere fabricated story constructed by the United States to realize its own aims. Indeed, the “second front” helped the Bush administration legitimize its militarization of Africa to secure better the continent’s natural resources (notably oil).
According to Jeremy Keenan, all the incidents that happened after 2003 are the outcome of the launching of the “second front” in the war on terror. Here he mentioned the Malian crisis and asserted that the turmoil in Northern Mali was intensified by U.S. and Algerian hidden hands. Indeed, he emphasized the Algerian role in the crisis saying that the reason behind its interference was to weaken the MNLA. To do so, it used its control of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to weaken the political effectiveness of the MNLA arguing that this is true if we follow the chronological order of the Tuareg rebellion which was launched by the MNLA. In other words, the MNLA at the beginning allied with the AQIM in order to take control of the Northern region (Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao). However, immediately after that, tensions between the Islamists and the MNLA broke into open fighting, resulting in the MNLA being driven out of its holdings in the north. As a result, the Islamists dominated the region and contributed much to its destruction. If Algeria did that (dealing with AQIM), it means that it violated its principles and attitudes towards terrorism and this is not true argued and demonstrated in the same chapter.

In addition, Keenan pointed out that the Algerian government sent about 200 Special Forces into Azwad in December 2011. The Algerian authorities, however, have denied it. He claimed that those troops were sent to help Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s new refuge in Northern Mali, to weaken the MNLA, and to “help establish two Islamists groups in the region- Ansar-al-Din and MUJAO. Keenan added that the leaders of these new groups-Ansar-al-Din’s Iyad ag Ghaly, and MUJAO’s Sultan Ould Badi have close ties with the DRS Algerian intelligence services. In addition, both of them are supported by members from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and this why they were able to expand so quickly and dominate Northern Mali both politically and military. If this holds true that the Algerian Special Forces were sent to
Azwad, this means that the Algerian government is a supportive of terrorism rather than a fighter. More, if Algeria helped the Islamists groups why then they attacked its gas planet of Tiguentourine, which is of great importance to the Algerian economy and income.

In my point of view, the analysis of Jeremy Keenan is not credible because its goes against Algerian principles and commitments. In addition, Algeria had much suffered the atrocities of terrorism and paid heavy losses (an estimated 200,000 Algerians were killed). Moreover, Algeria has proved its position toward terrorism during its turmoil years of the 1990’s where it made all its efforts to fight it. Algeria is also far from being a supportive of terrorism in the sense that the international community has appreciated its efforts in the struggle against terrorism; and this made it the ‘leading’ country in the fight of terrorism and all the countries sought to benefit from its experience. Concerning his claim, that Algeria sent troops to Northern Mali to weaken the MNLA and support Al Qaeda is also rejected because Algeria is among the first countries which called for a political solution to the crisis. This attitude can be proved by its rejection to intervene military in Mali despite the fact that it is the powerful country in the region and has all the abilities to intervene. Finally, Algeria did not aim to weaken the MNLA but it rejected its declaration on the basis that the MNLA allied with the Islamic groups (Ansar al-Dine and MUJAO).

**Conclusion**

U.S. - Algerian relations focused mainly on fighting terrorism. This close cooperation started immediately after the 9/11 when the U.S. recognized the importance of Algeria as an important partner in its Global War on Terror. This
recognition is based on the Algerian struggle during the black decade. Despite those ties in the fight against terrorism, there were some doubts about their cooperation in dealing with terrorism in the Sahel. Concerning the Algerian security, it seems through the analysis of several facts that the Tiguentourine might not be considered as a threat to the national security because Algeria has a strong and long experience in dealing with such situations. The impact then of the Malian crisis on Algeria is fears relating to the stability of the region, fears that what happened in Northern Mali might be repeated in the country.
GENERAL CONCLUSION

This Mémoire deals with U.S. Policy in Africa and its impact on Algerian national security. Particularly it focuses on the Malian crisis as an outcome of U.S. policy in Africa to highlight its impact on Algeria. U.S. Policy in Africa is based on two main issues that are oil and the fight against terrorism. African oil is of strategic national interest for the U.S. For this reason, the Bush administration sought to protect this vital resource by all means possible and even through the use of military force.

Indeed, the U.S. carried out its plans and established its military presence on the African continent. It used the ‘Global War on Terror’ to justify its militarization of Africa and thus securing its access to African oil. Indeed, it transformed the Sahelian Sahara into a terror zone and considers it as a “second front” in its War on Terror. It stressed the existence of terrorist groups in the region and that it was urgent to intervene to eliminate them.

As a result, the U.S. became able to justify its militarization of Africa under the umbrella of fighting terrorism and establishing stability. It launched two military programs, which are the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) in 2002 and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008. The former became the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) with the involvement of nine countries among them Algeria. However, both programs resulted in destructive results, political instability, anti Americanism and civil crises. We can say that these programs destroyed rather than enhanced peace and security in the region and this is what the U.S. needed to secure its interests in the continent.
In addition, this Memoire analyses U.S.-Algerian relations and focuses mainly on their cooperation in counterterrorism. The two countries built close ties in fighting this phenomenon especially after the events of 9/11. The U.S. saw Algeria as a key partner and that it can benefit from its experience to find a solution to this international threat.

Initially, this research work has hypothesized that the impact of the Malian turmoil on the Algerian security was the terrorist attack on Tiguentourine. This, however, did not stand scrutiny. The analysis of several facts related the events of Tiguentourine revealed that the main impact of the crisis was Algeria’s fears of facing the same situation as in Mali. Algeria was closer to face political instability and social turmoil following the example of Northern Mali. In the last few months, inhabitants in some regions in southern Algeria organized demonstrations asking for what they called “equal opportunities” as those enjoyed by Algerians inhabiting the north. This indeed constitutes the main personal conclusion of this thesis. As for the United States’ presence in the region, it is obvious that, as always, it is self-interested. The U.S. seeks to militarize Africa in order to secure its energy supplies. The global war on terror is but an excuse that serves for veiling the true American agendas for Africa. As far as bilateral relations are concerned, counterterrorism is still a vague action in the sense that the Americans invented Sahel terrorism then they pretended to fight it.
ENDNOTES

1 In February 2004, following a declaration by Libya that it would abandon its WMD programmes and comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), President Bush rescinded a ban on travel to Libya and authorized US oil companies with pre-sanctions holdings in Libya to negotiate on their return to the country. On 20 September 2004, President Bush signed Executive Order 12543, lifting most remaining US sanctions against Libya and paving the way for US oil companies to secure new contracts or revive old contracts for tapping Libya's oil reserves.

2 In 1997 the Clinton administration imposed economic sanctions on Sudan, prohibiting trade and investment by US oil companies. The Bush administration has since endeavored to promote a peace treaty between the government of the North and the Sudanese People's Liberation Front (SPLA) in the South.

3 The body of water closest to the major West African oil producers and is in itself the site of some of Africa's most promising offshore oil reserves.


5 Authors use different labels to analyze this turn in U.S. Policy, the “New Imperialism” to “the new Cold War.” The White House calls it “the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century.” Due to the repeated use of this title in political speeches, government policy reports, the phrase has become commonplace as a reference to the broad range of American counter-terrorism measures since 9/11.


9 The major part of the bend is a banana-shaped curve from Afghanistan and Central Asia to the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of the Maghreb.

10 U.S. AID is an independent federal government agency responsible for providing economic and humanitarian assistance in support of US foreign policy goals. As such, it has a noticeable presence in sub-Saharan Africa, where its current programs include bilateral field missions and three regional programs.

11 Concerning an alleged Sahraouis of the Polisario participation, these people are interested in defending the rights of the Sahraoui people (the right of independence) rather than trading with drugs.


13 Algerian political analyst Misbah Manas said that Algeria had an ‘unchangeable position’ which categorically rejects any ransom payment to secure the release of hostages (the kidnapping of Algerian diplomats in Gao by MUJAO).
14 This main Tuareg rebel group (Azawad National Liberation Movement) seeks the independence of northern Mali, which it considers the Tuareg homeland that it calls Azawad. The overall leader of the MNLA is Mohamed Ag Najim. A former ally of Ansar Dine and Mujao, the MNLA now is opposed to Islamist groups.

15 AQLIM-linked Tuareg Islamist movement is led by Iyad Ag Ghaly. Its objective is to impose Islamic law across Mali and its full name in Arabic is Harakat Ansar al-Dine, which translates as "movement of defenders of the faith". Ansar Dine fought alongside the MNLA, but when they seized the first of three northern capitals, fractures appeared in the relationship.

16 The movement is led by Ould Mohamed Kheirou, a Mauritanian Salafist, who escaped from a Mauritanian prison several years ago and joined AQLIM before later breaking away to spread jihad to West Africa rather than confine themselves just to the Maghreb or Sahel regions.

17 For more details, see In Aminas press Conference of Abed Elmalek Sellal on Algerie Service Press.com.
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Dissertations
